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NEIGHBOR-ON-NEIGHBOR 
HARASSMENT: DOES THE FAIR 
HOUSING ACT MAKE A  
FEDERAL CASE OUT OF IT? 
Robert G. Schwemm† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“This is a nice neighborhood—we don’t want people like you here. 
Why don’t you go back to the ghetto where you belong.”1 Does the 
federal Fair Housing Act2 (“FHA”) ban such statements to a minority 
family who has just moved into a predominantly white neighborhood? 
The FHA does contain an antiharassment provision (42 U.S.C. 
§ 3617),3 and this certainly applies to firebombings and other types of 
physical assault designed to drive the family out of the area.4 But does 
§ 3617 also outlaw purely verbal attacks? And if so, how egregious 
must the remarks be before a federal case should be made out of 
them? For example, would substituting “Niggers” for “people like 
you” in the above quote make a difference? 
Today, more than forty years after the FHA’s enactment in 1968,5 
housing harassment remains pervasive.6 Harassment and retaliation 
                                                                                                                  
† © 2011 Robert G. Schwemm. Robert G. Schwemm is the Ashland-Spears Professor at 
the University of Kentucky College of Law. I thank Florence Wagman Roisman, Sara Pratt, 
Harry Carey, and Sarah Welling for their ideas and helpful comments on this Article. 
1 These comments are a fictional amalgamation of actual remarks made to minorities in 
various reported fair housing cases. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 298. 
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006). 
3 See infra text accompanying note 29 (setting out the full text of the provision). 
4 See, e.g., infra notes 39, 72–76 and accompanying text (discussing cases dealing with 
§ 3617 violations). 
5 Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 73, 81–89. 
6 See, e.g., Jeannine Bell, Restraining the Heartless: Racist Speech and Minority Rights, 
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claims continue to account for a significant portion of all FHA 
claims.7 According to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (“HUD”), the agency primarily responsible for 
administering the FHA,8 well over a thousand § 3617 complaints 
were filed with HUD and state and local fair housing agencies in each 
of the past four years.9 A similar number of harassment claims are 
made each year to private fair housing groups.10 In one particularly 
egregious example of neighbor-on-neighbor harassment, a Latino 
family in 2009 was awarded over $500,000 in damages against one of 
                                                                                                                  
 
84 IND. L.J. 963, 964 (2009) (“[I]n the past twenty years, minorities moving to all-White 
neighborhoods in cities across the country have faced slurs, epithets, and other expressions of 
racism directed at them by White neighbors who wish to drive them out of the community.”). 
7 For modern case statistics involving FHA harassment claims, see infra notes 9–10. For 
examples of housing harassment cases dating back to the earlier years of the FHA, see infra 
notes 72 and 81. 
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(a) (2006) (giving HUD the “authority and responsibility for 
administering” the FHA). 
 9 Of the 10,242 FHA complaints filed with HUD and state and local fair housing 
agencies in fiscal year (FY) 2009, 1425 (14%) alleged violations of § 3617, making this the 
fourth largest category of claims of the thirteen categories reported, following only 
discriminatory refusals to rent, discriminatory terms and conditions, and refusals to make 
reasonable accommodations for disabled persons. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 
THE STATE OF FAIR HOUSING: ANNUAL REPORT ON FAIR HOUSING FY 2009, at 26 (2010), 
available at http://www.hud.gov/content/releases/fy2009annual-rpt.pdf [hereinafter 2009 
REPORT]. Comparable figures for prior years were: 1402 (13%) in FY 2008, 1477 (15%) in FY 
2007, 1354 (13%) in FY 2006, and 1192 (13%) in FY 2005. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN 
DEV., THE STATE OF FAIR HOUSING: FY 2008 ANNUAL REPORT ON FAIR HOUSING 6 (2009), 
available at http://www.hud.gov/content/releases/fy2008annual-rpt.pdf [hereinafter 2008 
REPORT]. According to HUD, these complaint statistics represent “only a fraction of instances 
of housing discrimination” that actually occur. Id. at 2. 
HUD does not break down these § 3617 claims by type of discrimination (e.g., race or 
sex), type of perpetrator (e.g., landlord or neighbor), or type of violation (e.g., harassment or 
retaliation) alleged. As to the last subcategory, however, HUD does report how many retaliation 
claims were made to state and local fair housing agencies and HUD in these years, with 
retaliation accounting for 654 of these claims (6% of the total) in FY 2009, 575 (5%) in FY 
2008, 588 (6%) in FY 2007, 577 (6%) in FY 2006, and 452 (5%) in FY 2005. See 2009 REPORT, 
supra, at 22; 2008 REPORT, supra, at 3. 
10 See NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALLIANCE, A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION: 2010 FAIR 
HOUSING TRENDS REPORT 24 (2010), available at http://www.nationalfairhousing.org 
/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=APout1nxpwg%3d&tabid=3917&mid=5321 (reporting that 1,221 
complaints of harassment were made to private fair housing groups in 2009 and that the primary 
bases of these complaints were national origin (26% of the total), familial status (25%), race 
(18%), sex (11%), and disability (10%)); see also NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALLIANCE, FAIR HOUSING 
ENFORCEMENT: TIME FOR A CHANGE: 2009 FAIR HOUSING TRENDS REPORT 17 (2009), 
available at http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=dsT4nlHikhQ%3d& 
tabid=3917&mid=5321 (reporting that 1,141 harassment complaints were made to private fair 
housing groups in 2008); NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALLIANCE, DR. KING’S DEARM DENIED: FORTY 
YEARS OF FAILED FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT: 2008 FAIR HOUSING TRENDS REPORT 50 (2008), 
available at http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=qPHxLtjvaGA%3d& 
tabid=3917&mid=5321 (reporting that 1,246 harassment complaints were made to private 
groups in 2007). 
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its white neighbors, although the legal basis for this case was state 
law, not the FHA.11  
Given how frequently housing harassment has occurred throughout 
the FHA’s history, one might expect that the statute’s application to 
neighbor-on-neighbor harassment would be settled by now. But a 
series of court decisions over the past decade—particularly two 
produced by the Seventh Circuit—has raised serious doubts about 
how this matter should be handled. 
The first of these came in 2004. Judge Posner’s opinion in Halprin 
v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n,12 held that 
homeowners subjected to anti-Jewish harassment by their neighbors 
could not sue under the FHA’s main substantive provision (§ 3604); it 
also suggested that § 3617 should be interpreted so as not to apply 
either.13 Halprin’s theory was that the FHA’s protections are limited 
to homeseekers and do not also cover current residents.14 But the 
Seventh Circuit rejected this theory five years later in its en banc 
opinion in Bloch v. Frischholz.15 Among other things, Bloch 
“effectively overrule[d] Halprin as far as § 3617 is concerned.”16 
While much of Halprin has now been swept aside,17 its hostility to 
the idea of applying the FHA to most types of neighbor-on-neighbor 
harassment lives on. Indeed, Bloch itself endorsed this part of the 
Halprin opinion by announcing that the behavior condemned by 
§ 3617 must be “more than a ‘quarrel among neighbors’ or an 
‘isolated act of discrimination,’ but rather [must be] a ‘pattern of 
                                                                                                                  
11 See Rodriguiz v. Marrone, No. 09 L 3194 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2009), Fair Housing–Fair 
Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.), Report Bulletin ¶ 10.2 (Oct. 1, 2009); see also Ky. Comm’n 
on Human Rights v. Foster, No. 04-CI-03103 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Feb. 1, 2008) (awarding a total of 
$860,000 in compensatory and punitive damages and civil penalties against three defendants for 
burning a cross, vandalizing property, and directing racial slurs against a black family). For 
other neighbor harassment cases that produced large awards, see infra notes 94–95, 304. For a 
recent example of a criminal prosecution in such a case, see United States v. Jackson, No. 3:10-
CR-00120-KLH (W.D. La. 2010). In Jackson, the defendant pleaded guilty to a FHA-related 
crime for engaging in race-based intimidation; he placed a hangman’s noose in the carport of a 
home next to his former employer. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Downsville, Louisiana, 
Man Pleads Guilty to Federal Hate Crime (June 24, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/2010/June/10-crt-742.html. 
12 388 F.3d 327 (7th Cir. 2004). 
13 Id. at 330; see also infra notes 39–40, 45–46 and accompanying text (discussing this 
holding in more detail). 
14 388 F.3d at 329; see also infra notes 39–47 and accompanying text (discussing this 
theory in more detail). 
15 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc). For further discussion of Bloch, see infra notes 
52–68 and accompanying text. 
16 Bloch, 587 F.3d at 782. 
17 Much, but not all. See infra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing what remains of 
Halprin). 
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harassment, invidiously motivated.’”18 Courts throughout the country 
have expressed similar misgivings about applying the FHA to 
neighbor harassment unless it involves systematic or highly abusive 
behavior.19 
But why should this be so? The text of § 3617 outlaws interference 
“with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of . . . any right granted 
or protected by” the FHA’s substantive provisions.20 This means, 
according to the governing interpretive regulation, that § 3617 bans 
“interfering with persons in their enjoyment of a dwelling” because of 
race or other FHA-prohibited factor.21 Certainly, hostile race-based 
comments would seem likely to interfere with any reasonable 
minority’s enjoyment of his or her home. Thus, if a neighbor verbally 
harasses a homeowner or renter because of that person’s race, 
national origin, religion, or other factor condemned by the FHA, it 
would appear that this behavior is covered by § 3617. 
Court opinions that have dismissed such behavior as merely a 
neighbors’ quarrel not worthy of being made into a “federal case” are 
essentially imposing some sort of de minimus defense on § 3617 
cases, because they believe the FHA was not intended to impose a 
“civility code” on neighbors.22 But the text of § 3617—surely the best 
indicator of congressional intent—contains no such defense.23 Nor is 
this provision analogous to the one in Title VII that the Supreme 
Court has interpreted to prohibit only “severe or pervasive” 
harassment in the employment context.24 Thus, the language of 
§ 3617 might well be interpreted to extend to even isolated hostile 
remarks, at least so long as that interpretation does not run afoul of 
the speaker’s First Amendment rights.25 Furthermore, there are good 
reasons to suppose that congressional concerns underlying the FHA 
                                                                                                                  
18 587 F.3d at 783 (quoting Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330). 
19 See cases cited infra notes 69, 102, 109, 210 and accompanying text. 
20 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2006). For the full text of this provision, see infra text accompanying 
note 29. 
21 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2) (2010). For the full text of this regulation, see infra text 
accompanying note 156. 
22 See, e.g., infra note 99 (discussing one district court’s reluctance to interpret § 3617 as 
imposing a code of civility on neighbors). 
23 See People Helpers Found., Inc. v. City of Richmond, 781 F. Supp. 1132, 1136 (E.D. 
Va. 1992) (denying the defendant-neighbors’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s § 3617 
claim, and noting that “if the trier of fact considers that the acts of the [defendants] constituted 
slight or de minimis interference, such a conclusion can be adequately reflected in an 
appropriate award of damages”).  
24 See infra note 215 (citing cases applying the “severe or pervasive” standard in Title VII 
cases). 
25 See infra Part III.E (discussing First Amendment considerations). 
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might well be advanced by broadly interpreting § 3617 to outlaw all 
forms of invidious harassment among neighbors.26 
This Article analyzes the issue of whether § 3617 should be 
interpreted to outlaw invidiously motivated disputes among 
neighbors. Part II begins by examining § 3617’s text and its 
relationship to the overall FHA. It then reviews § 3617 decisions in 
neighbor harassment cases, including Halprin and Bloch. This 
analysis shows that the scope of § 3617 is governed by the meaning 
of “interfere with” and the relationship of § 3617 to the prohibitions it 
references in §§ 3603–3606. These issues are further analyzed in Part 
III, which examines § 3617’s legislative history and purpose, its 
interpretation by HUD and courts in other types of § 3617 cases, 
Supreme Court decisions in analogous Title VII cases, and the issue 
of whether interpreting § 3617 to outlaw a neighbor’s verbal abuse 
would pose First Amendment problems. The Article concludes that 
applying § 3617 to neighbors’ quarrels (i.e., making a federal case out 
of them) is appropriate in a much broader range of cases than 
Halprin, Bloch, and many other decisions have allowed. 
II. § 3617: TEXT, RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER FHA PROVISIONS, AND 
NEIGHBOR HARASSMENT CASE LAW 
A. § 3617’s Text and Related Provisions 
The modern FHA is primarily the product of two statutes: the 
original law passed in 196827 and the Fair Housing Amendments Act 
of 198828 (“FHAA”). The current version of § 3617 was enacted by 
the FHAA and provides: 
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or 
interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or 
on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account 
of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the 
                                                                                                                  
26 For the relevant legislative history of § 3617, see infra Part III.B. 
27 Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 73, 81–89. 
28 Pub. L. No. 100–430, 102 Stat. 1619. Other amendments not germane to this Article 
have been made to the original 1968 FHA. See ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING 
DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION §§ 11C:1, 11E:8 (2010) (describing, respectively, FHA 
amendments adding “sex” to the list of prohibited bases of discrimination and changing the 
requirements for the “55 or over” housing-for-older-persons exemption to the prohibitions 
against familial status discrimination). For more on the 1988 FHAA, see infra notes 85–93 and 
accompanying text. 
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exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by 
section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title.29  
This language is identical in its substantive prohibitions to the version 
of this provision that was enacted in the original 1968 FHA.30 The 
only change made by the 1988 amendments was procedural: the 
FHAA made violations of § 3617 subject to the statute’s regular 
enforcement methods, which had previously controlled only claims 
under the FHA’s other substantive provisions.31 
The text of § 3617 shows that three elements are required for its 
violation: (1) the defendant must “coerce, intimidate, threaten, or 
interfere with” some person (2) “in the exercise or enjoyment of, or 
on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his 
having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or 
enjoyment of” (3) a “right granted or protected by” §§ 3603–3606. As 
for the first element, the meaning of the four verbs—particularly 
“interfere with”—is crucial in determining how far § 3617 goes in 
outlawing neighbor-on-neighbor harassment. The second element has 
three alternative parts, one of which—“having aided or encouraged” 
another—has produced a good deal of § 3617 litigation,32 but is not 
generally relevant to the problem of the harassment of minorities, 
                                                                                                                  
29 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2006).  
30 See Civil Rights Act of 1968 § 817, 82 Stat. at 89; infra notes 122, 128 and 
accompanying text (discussing the evolution of the proposed language for § 3617).  
31 This change was accomplished by broadening the FHA’s definition of “discriminatory 
housing practice” to include acts made unlawful by § 3617 and by deleting the second sentence 
in § 3617 (“This section may be enforced by appropriate civil action.”). The 1988 FHAA 
defines “discriminatory housing practice” to mean “an act that is unlawful under section 3604, 
3605, 3606, or 3617 of this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(f) (2006). The 1968 FHA defined the term 
to mean “an act that is unlawful under section 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3602(f) (1982); see also H.R. REP. NO. 100–711, at 21 (1988), reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2182 (“Section 5(a) [of the 1988 FHAA] broadens the definition of 
discriminatory housing practice to include prohibitions against coercion, intimidation, threats or 
interference under Section 817 [codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3617].”). 
An act that constitutes a “discriminatory housing practice” triggers the statute’s two 
private enforcement methods. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (authorizing complaints 
to HUD by persons aggrieved by “an alleged discriminatory housing practice”); id. 
§ 3613(a)(1)(A) (authorizing civil actions by persons aggrieved by “an alleged discriminatory 
housing practice”). This “discriminatory housing practice” phrase is not used in the provision 
that authorizes the FHA’s third enforcement method (civil actions by the Attorney General in 
“pattern or practice” and “general public importance” cases), id. § 3614(a), which is triggered 
by resistance to or denial of “any of the rights granted by” the FHA. This language is similar to 
that used in the 1968 FHA and has always authorized § 3617-based claims by the Attorney 
General. See SCHWEMM, supra note 28, § 20:1 n.9 (discussing § 3617 claims brought by the 
Attorney General pursuant to this enforcement method). 
For examples of § 3617 cases brought under the original second sentence of this provision 
in the 1968–1988 period, see infra notes 180–82 and accompanying text. 
32 See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 178, 182, and 185. 
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whose § 3617 claims turn on whether the behavior directed against 
them is in response to “the exercise or enjoyment of” their own FHA 
rights. Finally, a person asserting a claim under § 3617 must be, or 
must have been, exercising or enjoying a “right granted or protected 
by” §§ 3603–3606. 
The FHA provisions referred to in § 3617, i.e., §§ 3603–3606, 
contain the substantive heart of the statute. The most important of 
these provisions is § 3604, whose subsections (a) and (b) make it 
unlawful, respectively, to “refuse to sell or rent after the making of a 
bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or 
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person 
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national 
origin”33 and to “discriminate against any person in the terms, 
conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the 
provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of 
race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”34 The rest 
of §§ 3603–3606 outlaws various other specified discriminatory 
housing practices.35 
One other provision worth mentioning here is § 3631, which was 
passed along with the 1968 FHA as a separate title and which 
provides for criminal sanctions for anyone who “willfully injuries 
[sic], intimidates or interferes with” another’s fair housing rights “by 
force or threat of force.”36 Although technically not a part of the FHA, 
§ 3631’s prohibitions concerning interference with fair housing rights 
parallel those of § 3617, and the same behavior may produce both a 
criminal charge under § 3631 and a civil claim under § 3617.37 
B. § 3617 Case Law Involving Neighbor-on-Neighbor 
Harassment 
This Section surveys neighbor-on-neighbor harassment cases 
under § 3617 in two subsections. The first describes the Halprin and 
                                                                                                                  
33 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). A nearly identical prohibition dealing with handicap 
discrimination is contained in § 3604(f)(1). 
34 Id. § 3604(b). A nearly identical prohibition dealing with handicap discrimination is 
contained in § 3604(f)(2). 
35 Section 3603 provides for effective dates and certain exemptions. Section 3604’s 
remaining subsections deal, respectively, with discriminatory ads, notices, and statements; 
misrepresentations of availability; “blockbusting”; and handicap discrimination. Id. § 3604(c)–
(f). Section 3605 outlaws discriminatory home financing and other residential real estate–related 
transactions. Section 3606 bans discrimination in brokerage organizations and related services.  
36 Id. § 3631 (originally passed as Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1968). 
37 See infra notes 72–81 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving § 3631 
prosecutions). 
Commented [JM1]: This misspelling is unfortunately in §3631. 
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Bloch cases mentioned in the Introduction;38 the second deals with 
pre-Halprin cases, which are presented roughly in chronological 
order. The general conclusion of this Section is that § 3617’s 
applicability to neighbor-on-neighbor harassment raises issues with 
respect to all three of the elements of a § 3617 claim identified in the 
previous Section (i.e., Did the defendant’s behavior (1) “interfere 
with” (2) the plaintiff’s “exercise or enjoyment of” (3) a “right” 
recognized by §§ 3603–3606?). 
1. Halprin and Bloch 
The plaintiffs in both Halprin and Bloch alleged that the 
defendants’ conduct violated both § 3617 and one or more of the 
substantive provisions referred to in § 3617. In Halprin, the plaintiffs 
were a couple who owned a home in a Chicago suburb; they claimed 
that they were subjected to anti-Jewish epithets and other harassment 
by neighbors and the local homeowners’ association in violation of 
§§ 3604(a), 3604(b), and 3617.39 The Seventh Circuit held that, as 
homeowners, they could not pursue claims under § 3604(a) or 
§ 3604(b) because those provisions dealt only with activities “that 
prevent people from acquiring property”—not with the mistreatment 
of the purchasers or renters after acquisition.40 According to Judge 
Posner, in enacting § 3604 Congress was concerned only with “access 
to housing” and not harassment that might result from “unwanted 
associations” after property is acquired; if Congress had addressed 
postacquisition problems, that endeavor “would have required careful 
drafting in order to make sure that quarrels between neighbors did not 
become a routine basis for federal litigation.”41 
Halprin dealt with the plaintiffs’ § 3617 claim somewhat 
differently. Judge Posner ruled that this claim could proceed,42 but 
only because a HUD regulation interpreting § 3617 purported to 
extend it to postacquisition situations,43 and the defendants had not 
                                                                                                                  
38 See supra notes 12–18 and accompanying text. 
39 Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 328 
(7th Cir. 2004). 
40 Id. at 328–29 (emphasis added). Judge Posner did recognize that if hostile neighbors 
went so far as to burn down a minority’s house, such behavior might be covered by § 3604(a)’s 
make “unavailable” phrase or § 3604(b)’s language barring discriminatory “privileges of sale or 
rental.” Id. at 329. Short of such an extreme example amounting to “constructive eviction,” 
however, Halprin held that § 3604 does not apply to discrimination encountered by current 
residents of a dwelling. Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 330–31. 
43 The relevant HUD regulation forbids “interfering with persons in their enjoyment of a 
dwelling because of . . . [such persons’] religion.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2) (2010). Halprin 
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challenged the validity of this regulation.44 Still, the Halprin opinion 
strongly suggested that this regulation improperly extended the FHA 
“contrary to the language of section 3617,” and that § 3617, properly 
interpreted, would no more apply to postacquisition problems than 
§ 3604. This is because § 3617 “provides legal protection only against 
acts that interfere with one or more of the other sections of the Act 
that are referred to in section 3617.”45 In support of this view, Judge 
Posner reiterated that, whether under § 3617 or any other provision of 
the FHA, “we do not want, and we do not think Congress wanted, to 
convert every quarrel among neighbors in which a racial or religious 
slur is hurled into a federal case.”46 
Halprin’s theory that the FHA’s protections do not extend to 
current residents was controversial and marked a radical departure 
from prior case law.47 Some courts went along, notably the Fifth 
Circuit,48 but many did not.49 HUD and the Justice Department 
                                                                                                                  
 
conceded that the “enjoyment of a dwelling” in this regulation “can take place after the dwelling 
has been acquired.” 388 F.3d at 330. 
44 Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. The Halprin opinion recognized that in this case, the plaintiffs had alleged “a 
pattern of harassment, invidiously motivated, and . . . backed by the homeowners’ association,” 
which meant that it was “a matter of the neighbors’ ganging up on them” and thus it was “far 
from a simple quarrel between two neighbors or [an] isolated act of harassment.” Id. 
47 Prior to Halprin, courts regularly recognized FHA claims by current residents. See, e.g., 
SCHWEMM, supra note 28, § 14:3 nn.1–3, 5, 29–31, 36–37 (collecting cases in which courts 
recognized FHA claims by current residents); see also Halprin, 388 F.3d at 329 (noting five 
such cases, but opining that none of them “contains a considered holding on the scope of the 
Fair Housing Act in general or its application to a case like the present one in particular”). 
Commentators were generally critical of the Halprin theory. See Rigel C. Oliveri, Is 
Acquisition Everything? Protecting the Rights of Occupants Under the Fair Housing Act, 42 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008) (“Halprin and its progeny were wrongly decided . . . .”); 
Robert G. Schwemm, Cox, Halprin, and Discriminatory Municipal Services Under the Fair 
Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 717, 729–30 (2008) (identifying six failures in the Halprin 
opinion); Aric Short, Post-Acquisition Harassment and the Scope of the Fair Housing Act, 58 
ALA. L. REV. 203, 206 (2006) (noting that the court’s reasoning in Halprin, “if applied in future 
cases, would result in a significantly restricted ambit for the FHA, one limited only to claims of 
discrimination occurring during a real estate transaction”). 
48 See Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 740–47 (5th Cir. 2005) (adopting the Halprin 
theory that the FHA’s protections do not extend to current residents). District court decisions 
endorsing the Halprin theory include Lawrence v. Courtyards at Deerwood Ass’n, Inc., 318 F. 
Supp. 2d 1133, 1141–43 (S.D. Fla. 2004), and Gourlay v. Forest Lake Estates Civic Ass’n of 
Port Richey, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1235–36 (M.D. Fla. 2003), vacated pursuant to 
settlement, No. 8:02CV1955T30TGW, 2003 WL 22149660 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2003). For 
descriptions of Lawrence and Gourlay, see infra note 213. 
49 See, e.g., Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 
711–15 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the FHA reaches postacquisition discrimination); United 
States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 972–80 (D. Neb. 2004) (rejecting the argument that 
postacquisition claims cannot be maintained under the FHA); SCHWEMM, supra note 28, § 14:3 
n.20 (citing cases that reject Halprin). For a description of the Koch case, see infra note 262. 
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continued to support § 3604 claims brought by current residents50 and 
to defend HUD’s regulation providing for § 3617’s application to 
postacquisition situations.51 
Eventually, as noted above, the en banc Seventh Circuit rejected 
the Halprin theory in the Bloch case.52 Bloch also involved Jewish 
homeowners; the plaintiffs complained that officers of their 
condominium association (i.e., some of their neighbors) adopted rules 
that led to removal of the plaintiffs’ mezuzot from the doorposts 
outside their units in violation of §§ 3604(a), 3604(b), and 3617.53 
The Blochs also sued under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and various 
state law theories.54 The district court, relying on Halprin, granted 
                                                                                                                  
50 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs’ 
Opposition to Defendant’s 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, George v. Colony Lakes Prop. Owners 
Ass’n, No. 1:05-cv-05899, 2006 WL 1735345 (N.D. Ill. June 16, 2006), 2006 WL 1437953, at 
*6 n.3 (stating the Justice Department’s belief “that Section 3604 applies to post-acquisition 
discrimination” and disagreeing with Halprin’s contrary conclusion); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t 
of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD Charges Virginia Beach Landlord with Violating the Fair 
Housing Act (May 17, 2007), available at http://archives.hud.gov/news/2007/pr07-067.cfm 
(describing HUD’s charge against an apartment owner for violating the FHA by, inter alia, 
“subjecting African-American tenants to stricter rules than others”). 
51 See, e.g., United States v. Altmayer, 368 F. Supp. 2d 862, 863 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (denying 
the defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion in case prosecuted by the Justice Department and stating that 
until the court of appeals invalidates the regulation, the district court will apply the regulation as 
written); Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 978–79 (rejecting Halprin in case prosecuted by the Justice 
Department and holding that “the plain language of section 3617 should be read to prohibit 
unlawful discriminatory conduct after a person has taken possession of a dwelling”). 
52 Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
53 Id. at 772–75. 
54 Id. at 774–75. The relevant portion of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 guarantees U.S. 
citizens “the same right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, 
hold, and convey real and personal property.” 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006). The defendants did not 
dispute “the legal underpinnings of the § 1982 theory” but “only whether there [were] sufficient 
facts to support it.” 587 F.3d at 775 n.5. Based on its determination that the facts were sufficient 
to show intentional discrimination, the Seventh Circuit allowed the Blochs to proceed on their 
§ 1982 claim, along with their FHA claims under § 3604(b) and § 3617 and their state-law 
claims. Id. at 787. 
Section 1982 has provided an independent basis for housing-discrimination claims ever 
since the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
Sometimes § 1982 and the FHA overlap, as in Bloch, and sometimes § 1982 alone provides 
coverage when gaps in the FHA preclude it from applying. See SCHWEMM, supra note 28, 
§ 27:2 (discussing the independence of § 1982 and the FHA); see also CBOCS W., Inc. v. 
Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1961 (2008) (noting Congress’s longstanding general intent to 
provide overlapping remedies against discrimination). Courts have not yet considered the degree 
to which § 1982 outlaws neighbor-on-neighbor harassment independent of the FHA, but it is 
clear, based on Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969), that § 1982 does 
provide a cause of action for persons who are injured by a defendant’s interference with § 1982 
rights. See CBOCS W., 128 S. Ct. at 1955 (describing Sullivan’s holding); Gomez–Perez v. 
Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1936 (2008) (same). Indeed, given § 1982’s language explicitly 
guaranteeing a right to “hold” property equal to that “enjoyed” by whites, § 1982’s coverage of 
neighbor harassment is arguably even more clear than § 3617’s. See, e.g., Shaare Tefila 
Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617 (1987) (holding that vandalizing a synagogue is 
actionable under § 1982). In any event, it is at least possible that, to the extent the FHA is 
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summary judgment for the defendants, and a divided panel of the 
Seventh Circuit affirmed,55 but the en banc court took a decidedly 
different approach in a unanimous opinion.56 It held that some 
postacquisition situations are indeed covered by § 3604(a) and (b).57 
The en banc decision also upheld the plaintiffs’ § 3617 claim,58 
endorsing HUD’s view that § 3617 covers postacquisition harassment 
and determining that HUD’s § 3617 regulation should be given “great 
weight” in interpreting this provision.59 This part of the Bloch opinion 
began by noting that a § 3617 violation could occur even without a 
violation of § 3604.60 Thus: 
                                                                                                                  
 
interpreted not to apply in such a case, a plaintiff might still be able to prevail under § 1982. 
55 Bloch, 587 F.3d at 775. 
56 In an amazing reversal of views, Judge Posner and three other Seventh Circuit judges 
who had previously endorsed Halprin’s narrow reading of the FHA changed their minds and 
joined the en banc opinion in Bloch. The eight judges who joined the Bloch en banc opinion 
included two who had joined the Halprin opinion (Posner and Kanne), and two others who had 
followed Halprin in ruling against the plaintiffs in the Bloch panel decision (Easterbrook and 
Bauer). Id. at 772. Judge Williams, who had also joined the Halprin opinion, took no part in the 
consideration of the Bloch case. Id. at 772 n.*. 
57 See id. at 776–79 (describing how postacquisition harassment may make housing 
“unavailable” under § 3604(a)); id. at 779–81 (describing two situations in which 
postacquisition claims would be possible under § 3604(b) and, in particular, discussing how 
§ 3604(b)’s “privileges” might be involved in such cases). 
58 Id. at 781–83. 
59 Id. at 782 (quoting Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Decisions between Halprin and Bloch generally agreed that 
this regulation is valid. See, e.g., Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park 
Ass’n, No. 01 C 4673, 2006 WL 2506223, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 2006); George v. Colony 
Lake Prop. Owners Ass’n, No. 05 C 5899, 2006 WL 1735345, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. June 16, 2006); 
King v. Metcalf 56 Homes Ass’n, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1142–45 (D. Kan. 2005); United 
States v. Altmayer, 368 F. Supp. 2d 862, 863 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Richards v. Bono, No. 
5:04CV484-OC-10GRJ, 2005 WL 1065141, at *6 (M.D. Fla. May 2, 2005); United States v. 
Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 978–80 (D. Neb. 2004). But see Jones v. South Bend Hous. Auth., 
No. 3:08-CV-596, 2009 WL 1657466, at *4–5 (N.D. Ind. June 10, 2009) (holding this 
regulation invalid); Reule v. Sherwood Valley I Council of Co-Owners, Inc., No. Civ.A. H-05-
3197, 2005 WL 2669480, at *4 n.4 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2005) (same), aff’d, 235 Fed. App’x 227 
(5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). 
For its part, after Halprin, the Seventh Circuit twice avoided ruling on the regulation’s 
validity by finding that the defendant, as in Halprin, waived this issue and then ruling against 
the plaintiff-resident’s § 3617 claim on the merits. See Walton v. Claybridge Homeowners 
Ass’n, Inc., 191 Fed. App’x 446, 450 (7th Cir. 2006); East–Miller v. Lake Cnty. Highway 
Dep’t, 421 F.3d 558, 562 n.1 (7th Cir. 2005). For further discussion of Walton, see infra notes 
70–71. 
60 Bloch, 587 F.3d at 781. Until Bloch, the Seventh Circuit had reserved this question, see 
id., but numerous other courts had held that a § 3617 violation does not require a violation of 
some other FHA provision. See cases cited infra notes 182, 191. As the Bloch opinion put it: 
To hold otherwise would make § 3617 entirely duplicative of the other FHA 
provisions; though its language is unique in the FHA, § 3617 would have no 
independent meaning. But “when the legislature uses certain language in one part of 
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Coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference with or on 
account of a person’s exercise of his or her §§ 3603–3606 
rights can be distinct from outright violations of §§ 3603–
3606. For instance, if a landlord rents to a white tenant but 
then threatens to evict him upon learning that he is married to 
a black woman, the landlord has plainly violated § 3617, 
whether he actually evicts the tenant or not.61  
As Bloch put it, because “§ 3604 prohibits discriminatory evictions, it 
follows that attempted discriminatory evictions can violate § 3617’s 
prohibition against interference with § 3604 rights.”62 Thus, a § 3617 
claim based on interference “with or on account of plaintiff’s § 3604 
rights does not require that the plaintiff actually vacate the 
premises.”63 As a result, § 3617 “reaches a broader range of post-
acquisition conduct” than § 3604.64 These rulings meant that the 
plaintiffs in Bloch could prevail under § 3617 if they showed that the 
defendants interfered with the “exercise or enjoyment of their right to 
inhabit their condo units because of their race or religion.”65 The 
                                                                                                                  
 
the statute and different language in another, the court assumes different meanings 
were intended.”  
587 F.3d at 781–82 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 n.9 (2004)). 
61 587 F.3d at 782. 
62 Id. An actual discriminatory eviction would presumably violate both § 3604 and 
§ 3617, but the applicability of two FHA provisions to this one situation did not trouble the 
Bloch court, which noted, “That §§ 3604 and 3617 might overlap in some circumstances is 
‘neither unusual nor unfortunate.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 778 
(1979)). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. Bloch itself provided an example of this, as the en banc opinion held that the 
defendants’ conduct might well violate the plaintiffs’ rights under § 3617, but that it did not 
violate their § 3604(a) rights because it had not caused their constructive eviction. Id. at 777–79. 
65 Id. at 783. According to the en banc opinion, a plaintiff in the Blochs’ position must 
show four things to prevail on a § 3617 claim, i.e., that: 
(1) she is a protected individual under the FHA, (2) she was engaged in the exercise 
or enjoyment of her fair housing rights, (3) the defendants coerced, threatened, 
intimidated, or interfered with the plaintiff on account of her protected activity under 
the FHA, and (4) the defendants were motivated by an intent to discriminate. 
Id. (citing East–Miller v. Lake Cnty. Highway Dep’t, 421 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2005)). For 
similar descriptions of the elements required for this type of § 3617 claim, see Walton v. 
Claybridge Homeowners Ass’n, 191 Fed. App’x 446, 450 (7th Cir. 2006); People Helpers 
Found., Inc. v. City of Richmond, 781 F. Supp. 1132, 1136 (E.D. Va. 1992); HUD v. Krueger, 
Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,119, at 26,026 (HUD ALJ 1996), 
available at 1996 WL 418886, aff’d sub nom. Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 
1997); HUD v. Kogut, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,100, at 25,895, 
25,904 (HUD ALJ 1995), available at 1995 WL 225277; HUD v. Gutleben, Fair Housing–Fair 
Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,078, ¶ 25,726 (HUD ALJ 1994), available at 1994 WL 
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Bloch opinion recognized that “this interpretation effectively 
overrules Halprin as far as § 3617 is concerned.”66 But one aspect of 
Halprin remained—its determination that mere “quarrels among 
neighbors,” even if invidiously motivated, should not give rise to a 
FHA claim.67 The Bloch opinion endorsed this view and thus 
concluded that only a “pattern of harassment” could violate § 3617.68 
This was the one part of Halprin that apparently was not 
controversial. Indeed, even before Halprin was decided in 2004, a 
number of other courts had expressed similar views in § 3617 
cases69—albeit generally in dicta, as in Halprin and Bloch70—and no 
case took the contrary position in the five years between Halprin and 
the en banc decision in Bloch.71 
2. § 3617 Case Law Before Halprin 
By the time Halprin was decided in 2004, about thirty cases had 
been reported that involved § 3617 harassment claims brought by 
protected-class homeowners and renters. One of the earliest was 
Stackhouse v. DeSitter,72 in which a new black resident of a white 
                                                                                                                  
 
441981, modified, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,103 (HUD ALJ 
1994). For more on the fourth element set forth in Bloch and these other cases, see infra notes 
272–73 and accompanying text. 
66 587 F.3d at 782. 
67 Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n , 388 F.3d 327, 
329–30 (7th Cir. 2004). 
68 587 F.3d at 783 (quoting Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
69 See, e.g., Gourlay v. Forest Lake Estates Civic Ass’n of Port Richey, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 
2d 1222, 1236 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (determining that the FHA should not be interpreted as “an all 
purpose cause of action for neighbors of different races, origins, faiths, or with different types or 
concepts of families to bring neighborhood feuds into federal court when the dispute has little or 
no actual relation to housing discrimination”), vacated pursuant to settlement, 2003 WL 
22149660 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2003); infra notes 99–109 and accompanying text (discussing 
two more district court cases); infra note 210 (quoting an additional district court case). 
70 These views were only dicta in Halprin and Bloch because the courts there found that 
such a pattern was alleged, Bloch, 587 F.3d at 783; Halprin, 338 F.3d at 330, as was true in 
many of the other opinions that have endorsed this view. For exceptions, see cases quoted infra 
note 71; infra note 103 and accompanying text. 
71 Only a handful of neighbor-on-neighbor harassment cases were reported between 
Halprin and Bloch. See district court cases cited supra note 48. The Seventh Circuit itself 
decided one in an unreported decision that rejected such a § 3617 claim asserted by a black 
renter acting pro se. See Walton v. Claybridge Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 191 Fed. App’x 446 
(7th Cir. 2006). Walton held, based on Halprin’s view that “there is a difference between a 
pattern of and an isolated act of harassment,” id. at 451 (citing Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330), that a 
white neighbor’s remark that “there is more than one way to lynch a nigger,” id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted), was merely “a single act of harassment that could not create a hostile 
housing environment,” id. at 452 (citing DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008–09 (7th Cir. 
1996)), and thus could not sustain an interference claim under § 3617.  
72 566 F. Supp. 856 (N.D. Ill. 1983), reconsideration granted in part, 620 F. Supp. 208 
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Chicago suburb alleged that a neighbor firebombed his car to 
intimidate the plaintiff and his family and drive them out of the area.73 
The defendant was convicted of arson in a separate state court 
proceeding.74 With respect to the plaintiff’s civil action, Judge Aspen 
initially questioned § 3617’s applicability,75 but then held two years 
later that the defendant’s behavior was “squarely within the range of 
actions prohibited by § 3617.”76 
Claims like the one in Stackhouse, brought by minority families 
who are harassed because they were about to move or had moved into 
predominantly white areas, presumably come within the language of 
§ 3617 that protects a “person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on 
account of his having exercised or enjoyed” FHA rights.77 In a 
number of early cases involving this scenario, the harassment was so 
violent that the Justice Department prosecuted the offenders in 
criminal actions based on § 3631,78 which was passed in 1968 as a 
companion title to the FHA.79 Victims of such behavior are 
presumably entitled to bring civil claims under § 3617,80 but only a 
handful actually did so in the first two decades of the FHA.81 
                                                                                                                  
 
(N.D. Ill. 1985). 
73 Stackhouse, 620 F. Supp. at 209, 211. 
74 Id. at 211. 
75 Stackhouse, 566 F. Supp. at 859. 
76 Stackhouse, 620 F. Supp. at 211. 
77 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2006). For the full text of this section, see supra text accompanying 
note 28. 
78 See, e.g., United States v. White, 788 F.2d 390 (6th Cir. 1986) (upholding the 
defendant’s conviction for conspiring with others to burn down a black family’s home); United 
States v. Redwine, 715 F.2d 315 (7th Cir. 1983) (upholding the defendants’ convictions for 
throwing rocks at and firebombing a black family’s home); United States v. Anzalone, 555 F.2d 
317 (2d Cir. 1977) (reversing the defendants’ convictions for acts of vandalism and arson 
directed against a black family because the defendants had been indicted by the same grand jury 
that heard their immunized testimony), aff’d on reh’g, 560 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1977). In addition, 
some § 3631 prosecutions were brought against defendants who targeted white homeowners for 
physical violence and threats because they had brought black friends into their homes. E.g., 
United States v. Wood, 780 F.2d 955 (11th Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Johns, 615 F.2d 
672 (5th Cir. 1980) (involving defendants who targeted an interracial couple). 
79 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
80 See, e.g., United States v. Pospisil, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1062–64 (W.D. Mo. 2000) 
(granting summary judgment in favor of § 3617 claim brought on behalf of minority family 
whose home was the target of the defendants’ cross burning, which had already resulted in 
criminal convictions under § 3631); cf. United States v. Vartanian, 245 F.3d 609, 612 (6th Cir. 
2001) (noting that targets of the defendant’s behavior had, before the defendant’s § 3631 
conviction, filed civil suit under state fair housing law that “resulted in a judgment and a 
substantial monetary award in favor of the plaintiffs”). 
81 See, e.g., Stirgus v. Benoit, 720 F. Supp. 119, 121, 123 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that the 
plaintiff’s allegation that firebombing of her home deprived her of the right to enjoy and hold 
property on an equal basis with white citizens was sufficient to support a § 3617 claim); 
Seaphus v. Lilly, 691 F. Supp. 127, 138–39 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that the plaintiff’s 
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Also beginning in the 1980s, some courts held sexual harassment 
claims actionable under § 3617.82 There are, however, two 
noteworthy distinctions between the sex-based and race-based 
harassment claims brought during this period. First, the race-based 
cases often involved only a § 3617 claim, whereas all of the sex 
harassment decisions found liability under § 3604(b) or some other 
FHA provision as well as under § 3617. Indeed, many held that the 
standards for judging a defendant’s conduct were the same under 
§ 3617 as under the FHA’s other provisions (i.e., the § 3617 claim 
was not independently valuable to the plaintiff).83 Second, although 
some of the defendants in the sex harassment cases lived near the 
plaintiffs, they were generally sued in their role as landlords or other 
housing providers, not neighbors.84  
                                                                                                                  
 
allegation that the defendants attempted to force the plaintiff from his home might support a 
claim under § 3617); Waheed v. Kalafut, No. 86 C 6674, 1988 WL 9092, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 
1988) (holding that the allegation that the defendant attempted to oust a black family from their 
home was sufficient to support a § 3617 claim). Virtually all of these early § 3617 harassment 
cases arose, like Stackhouse, in the Chicago area. See Ohana v. 180 Prospect Place Realty Corp., 
996 F. Supp. 238, 241 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting that most prior cases recognizing such a § 3617 
claim have “come from the Northern District of Illinois”). 
82 See, e.g., Grieger v. Sheets, 689 F. Supp. 835, 840–41 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that the 
plaintiff, who refused the defendant’s sexual demands, was intimidated, threatened, or interfered 
with by him as required for a § 3617 claim); New York ex rel. Abrams v. Merlino, 694 F. Supp. 
1101, 1103–04 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that the plaintiffs can succeed under § 3617 if they can 
demonstrate severe and pervasive sexual harassment as well as a relationship between that 
harassment and housing). For more modern sex harassment cases brought under § 3617, see 
infra notes 113, 301–06 and accompanying text. 
83 See SCHWEMM, supra note 28, § 11C:2 nn.36–37 and accompanying text. 
84 See, e.g., Greiger, 689 F. Supp. at 836 (defendant sued in role as landlord); see also 
cases cited infra note 113. 
In some cases, harassment by other neighbors was alleged, but the issue was whether the 
defendant-landlord should be held liable for this harassment, not whether these other neighbors 
were liable. The courts are divided as to whether a landlord or other housing provider may be 
held liable for tolerating neighbor-on-neighbor harassment. Compare Neudecker v. Boisclair 
Corp., 351 F.3d 361, 364–65 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Yes” in § 3617 case), Scialabba v. Sierra Blanca 
Condo. No. One Ass’n, No. 00 C 5344, 2000 WL 1889664, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2000) 
(“Yes” in case alleging a “violation of § 3604(f)(1), in conjunction with § 3617”), Wilstein v. 
San Tropai Condo. Master Ass’n, No. 98 C 6211, 1999 WL 262145, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 22, 
1999) (“Yes” under the FHA), Reeves v. Carrollsburg Condo. Unit Owners Ass’n, Fair 
Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 16,250, at 16,250.6–.7 (D.D.C. 1997), 
available at 1997 WL 1877201 (“Yes” under the FHA and §§ 1981–1982), and Bradley v. 
Carydale Ents., 707 F. Supp. 217, 223–25 (E.D. Va. 1989) (“Yes” in case brought under 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982 and state and local fair housing laws), with Haynes v. Wilder Corp. of 
Del., 721 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1228 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (“Neither the FHA nor the ADA requires a 
landlord to intervene in a purely private dispute among tenants.”); Lawrence v. Courtyards at 
Deerwood Ass’n, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1141–43 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (“No” in FHA case), 
and Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth., 892 N.E.2d 415, 417–20 (Ohio 
2008) (“No” under Ohio fair housing law). The issue of this type of  vicarious liability comes up 
in other situations as well. See, e.g., Egan v. Schmock, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 
2000) (declining to hold husband liable for wife’s racially motivated harassment of an Indian 
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In the 1990s and early 2000s before Halprin, many more cases 
involving § 3617 claims of race- or sex-based harassment were 
reported. Before dealing with these cases, it is important to describe 
the ways in which the FHAA impacted them. As noted above, the 
FHAA made § 3617 claims subject to the FHA’s regular enforcement 
methods.85 It left intact § 3631 (the criminal-interference statute) as 
well as most of the other substantive prohibitions to which § 3617 
refers (i.e., §§ 3603–3606). It did, however, add “familial status” and 
“handicap” to the bases of discrimination forbidden by these 
provisions.86 Additionally, in response to Congress’s perception that 
continuing high levels of housing discrimination had resulted in part 
from the inadequate enforcement system of the 1968 FHA,87 the 
FHAA strengthened both the private and governmental enforcement 
mechanisms of the FHA.88 The FHAA’s new enforcement system 
provided, inter alia, that private complaints, including those now 
based on § 3617, could be filed with HUD and could ultimately result 
in charges that were prosecuted by government lawyers either before 
HUD administrative law judges or in federal court.89 Finally, the 
FHAA directed HUD to promptly issue rules interpreting the new 
                                                                                                                  
 
family under agency theory in FHA case); SCHWEMM, supra note 28, § 11C:2 n. 58 (citing FHA 
cases dealing with housing provider’s vicarious liability for employee’s harassment of the 
plaintiff); cf. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 790–92, 807–08 (1998) (describing 
the circumstances under which an employer is liable for harassment by its employees under 
Title VII); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760–65 (1998) (same). 
85 See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
86 SCHWEMM, supra note 28, § 5:3. The only other major substantive change dealt with 
expanding § 3605’s prohibition of mortgage discrimination and other residential real estate–
related transactions. See id. § 18:1 nn.5–14 and accompanying text. 
87 One of the FHAA’s key goals was to provide the 1968 FHA with “an effective 
enforcement system” in order to make the FHA’s promise of nondiscrimination “a reality,” 
because the 1988 Congress saw the original FHA as having been “ineffective because it lack[ed] 
an effective enforcement mechanism.” H.R. REP. NO. 100-711, at 13, 15–16 (1988), reprinted in 
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2174, 2176–77. 
88 The FHAA strengthened all three of the FHA’s enforcement techniques by 
(1) establishing an expedited administrative complaint procedure that could result in injunctive 
relief, damages, and civil penalties; (2) eliminating the punitive damage cap, lengthening the 
statute of limitations, and making attorney’s fees awards easier to obtain in private litigation; 
and (3) authorizing the Justice Department to collect monetary damages for aggrieved persons 
in its “pattern or practice” and “general public importance” cases. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610–3614 
(2006); SCHWEMM, supra note 28, § 5:3 nn.6–9 and accompanying text; id. § 24:1–:2. See 
generally id. ch. 24–26 (discussing the FHA’s three enforcement methods). 
89 See SCHWEMM, supra note 28, ch. 24 (discussing complaints to HUD). Private 
complainants could also bypass this system and file suit directly in court, as was also true under 
the 1968 FHA. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a) (describing enforcement of FHA in civil action by 
private persons); SCHWEMM, supra note 28, § 24:1 n.11 and accompanying text (discussing 
same). 
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FHA.90 HUD complied in early 1989, and the resulting regulations 
included one on the meaning of § 3617.91 As noted above, HUD’s 
§ 3617 regulation played a key role in both Halprin and Bloch,92 and 
it was also available for guidance—indeed, was required to be given 
Chevron deference93—in all other § 3617 cases after 1989. 
Most of the reported § 3617 decisions involving minority 
harassment between 1989 and Halprin favored the claimants. Five of 
these were HUD administrative decisions that found § 3617 violations 
after an evidentiary hearing.94 The behavior in three of these cases 
involved only verbal attacks on the complainants; two of the three 
involved a series of such attacks,95 but in the third, liability was based 
only on a single conversation.96 
Court decisions during this period generally took the form of 
pretrial rulings that focused on whether the plaintiffs’ complaint was 
sufficient to state a claim under § 3617, rather than trial-based 
                                                                                                                  
90 42 U.S.C. § 3601, note on Initial Rulemaking. Prior to the FHAA, HUD had issued a 
few FHA regulations pursuant to a provision in the 1968 FHA giving HUD the “authority and 
responsibility for administering” the FHA. Id. § 3608(a). The FHAA made explicit HUD’s 
authority to issue such regulations and indeed mandated that HUD do this within 180 days of 
the FHAA’s passage. Id. § 3601, note on Initial Rulemaking. 
91 24 C.F.R. § 100.400 (2010). For the text of this regulation, see infra note 156 and 
accompanying text. 
92 See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text (discussing Halprin); supra note 60 and 
accompanying text (discussing Bloch). 
93 For a discussion of Chevron deference, see infra notes 152–54 and accompanying text. 
94 See HUD v. Simpson, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,082, 
at 25,760 (HUD ALJ 1994), available at 1994 WL 497538 (holding that the respondent-
neighbors’ two-year campaign of harassment against Hispanic family that included numerous 
incidents of physical conduct and verbal abuse interfered with the family “in the enjoyment of a 
dwelling” in violation of § 3617 and awarding $180,000 in emotional distress damages to three 
members of the family plus other monetary relief and $20,000 in civil penalties); HUD v. 
Lashley, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,039 (HUD ALJ 1992), 
available at 1992 WL 406539 (awarding maximum civil penalty and $67,000 in damages 
against two respondent-neighbors for violating § 3617 by verbally abusing a minority family 
and attempting to firebomb their home); cases cited infra notes 95–96. 
95 HUD v. Gutleben, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,078, 
¶¶ 25,726–28 (HUD ALJ 1994), available at 1994 WL 441981 (determining that the 
responsent-neighbor interfered with black tenants in violation of § 3617 by a series of remarks 
that included racial epithets directed at the complainants’ children and efforts to convince their 
landlord to evict complainants), modified, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) 
¶ 25,103 (HUD ALJ 1994); HUD v. Johnson, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & 
Bus.) ¶ 25,076 (HUD ALJ 1994), available at 1994 WL 391135 (awarding maximum civil 
penalty and $300,000 in emotional distress damages for the responsent-neighbor’s violation of 
§ 3617 based on lengthy campaign of verbal abuse and threats directed against a minority tenant 
and his white friend).  
96 HUD v. Weber, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,041, ¶ 25,424 
(HUD ALJ 1993), available at 1993 WL 42262 (finding a § 3617 violation where the 
respondent-neighbor made threats and otherwise “verbally assaulted” the Hmong complainant 
while the latter was inspecting next-door house as a prospective tenant). For further discussion 
of the Weber case, see infra note 276. 
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rulings.97 The allegations in virtually all of these cases set forth a 
series of verbal and sometimes even physical attacks by the 
defendants, with the courts generally holding that such behavior, if 
proved, would violate the minority plaintiffs’ rights under § 3617.98 
In some cases, however, district courts expressed skepticism about 
applying § 3617 to a neighbors’ dispute even when a lengthy pattern 
of harassment was alleged.99 One of these was Egan v. Schmock,100 a 
                                                                                                                  
97 One case that did go to trial during this period was United States ex rel. Smith v. Hobbs, 
44 F. Supp. 2d 788, 789–90 (S.D.W.Va. 1999), where, after a jury verdict for the black 
plaintiffs, the court—albeit without mentioning § 3617—granted a permanent injunction barring 
the defendant-neighbors from continuing to “interfere” with the plaintiffs’ FHA rights in a case 
in which the defendants repeatedly hurled egregious racial epithets and threats of physical 
violence while brandishing weapons. 
98 See, e.g., United States v. Altmayer, 368 F. Supp. 2d 862, 863 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (denying 
the defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the government’s § 3617 claim, which was based on 
an alleged “extended pattern of harassment” against the intervenor-plaintiffs, because the 
harrassment was “backed by the homeowners’ association to which the plaintiffs belong, 
[making it] a matter of the neighbors’ ganging up on them”); Ohana v. 180 Prospect Place 
Realty Corp., 996 F. Supp. 238, 239–43 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (denying the defendant-neighbors’ 
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ § 3617 claim, which alleged “a series of 
discriminatory acts . . . [that] took the form of racial and anti-Jewish slurs and epithets, threats 
of bodily harm, and noise disturbances”); Byrd v. Brandeburg, 922 F. Supp. 60, 62–65 (N.D. 
Ohio 1996) (granting the black plaintiffs summary judgment on liability on their §§ 3617, 
3604(a), and 1982 claims based on the defendant-neighbor’s tossing a Molotov cocktail onto 
porch of the plaintiffs’ home); Johnson v. Smith, 810 F. Supp. 235, 236–39 (N.D. Ill. 1992) 
(denying defendant-neighbors’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ § 3617 claim, which 
alleged that the defendants burned a cross in the plaintiffs’ yard and broke a window in their 
home because three of the children in the home were mixed race); see also Johns v. Stillwell, 
No. 3:07cv00063, 2008 WL 2795884, at *1 (W.D. Va. July 18, 2008) (denying the defendant-
landlord’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims under §§ 3604(a)–(c) and 3617, 
which alleged that the defendant and the plaintiffs’ neighbors engaged “in a pattern of racial 
harassment and intimidation” over a six-year period that included verbal abuse and destruction 
of property (the court dealt exclusively with the § 3604(c) claim becaue the defendant’s motion 
to dismiss did not challenge the other claims)); Bryant v. Polston, No. IP 00-1064-C-T/G, 2000 
WL 1670938, at *2–3 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 2, 2000) (denying the defendant-neighbors’ 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss the white plaintiffs’ claim under § 3617, which alleged that the defendants 
subjected them to “a continuous pattern of racially derogatory remarks, acts of intimidation and 
gestures of violence or bodily harm with a gun” because the plaintiffs entertained blacks in their 
home); see also People Helpers Found., Inc. v. City of Richmond, 781 F. Supp. 1132, 1133–36 
(E.D. Va. 1992) (denying the defendant-neighbors’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s 
§ 3617 claim, which accused the defendants of making numerous derogatory and threatening 
remarks and otherwise working to stop the plaintiff-organization from operating a group home 
for disabled minorities in the defendants’ neighborhood). 
For further discussion of the Ohana decision, see infra notes 260–64 and accompanying 
text. 
99 In addition to the Egan and Weisz opinions discussed in the text, see infra text 
accompanying notes 100–08, such skeptical comments also appeared in Sporn v. Ocean Colony 
Condominium Ass’n, 173 F. Supp. 2d 244, 251 (D.N.J. 2001), a case involving several FHA 
claims based on handicap and familial-status discrimination. The § 3617 claim in Sporn was 
based on allegations that, in retaliation for the plaintiffs’ having filed a HUD complaint accusing 
their condominium officials of discriminating against families with children, those officials and 
other neighbors responded by “shunning” the plaintiffs. Id. Because this claim was based on the 
defendants’ response to the plaintiffs’ FHA complaint rather than to their status as families with 
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2000 case that dismissed a § 3617 claim by a California minority 
family who alleged that the defendant-neighbors had engaged in 
numerous acts of physical harassment and verbal abuse against the 
plaintiffs over a nine-year period.101 The Egan court rejected the 
theory that “any discriminatory conduct which interferes with an 
individual’s enjoyment of his or her home” violates § 3617, because 
this would mean that “any dispute between neighbors of different 
races or religions could result in a lawsuit in federal court under the 
FHA.”102 Instead, the court held that only those acts that are 
“designed to drive the victim out of his or her home” should be 
actionable.103 
Another district court dismissal of a § 3617 claim based on a 
neighbors’ dispute occurred in 1996 in a case from the New York 
City area, United States v. Weisz.104 The Justice Department brought 
this case on behalf of a Catholic family (the Cronins), who claimed 
that a Jewish neighbor (Pearl Weisz) harassed them over an eighteen-
month period “because of the Cronins’ religion.”105 The Weisz court 
discounted the religious nature of this dispute, concluding that the 
defendant’s behavior was prompted by the Cronins’ conduct, not their 
religion.106 The court conceded that some of the alleged incidents 
                                                                                                                  
 
children or disabled persons, it is not like the cases discussed in this section. (For a further 
discussion of retaliation claims based on § 3617, see infra notes 187–89 and accompanying 
text.) In the course of granting summary judgment for the defendants, however, the Sporn court 
did express specific concerns about interpreting § 3617 too broadly in cases involving neighbor 
harassment, commenting that § 3617 does not “impose a code of civility” on neighbors nor does 
it “require that neighbors smile, say hello or hold the door for each other.” 173 F. Supp. 2d at 
251. For a further discussion of Sporn, see infra notes 206–11 and accompanying text.  
100 93 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
101 Id. at 1092–93. 
102 Id. at 1093.  
103 Id. Based on this standard, the Egan court dismissed the FHA claim with leave to 
amend the complaint to add an allegation that the defendants’ harassment was “designed to 
drive [the plaintiffs] out of [their] home.” Id. 
104 914 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
105 Id. at 1053 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
106 According to the Weisz court, the complaint’s allegations 
recite nothing more than a series of skirmishes in an unfortunate war between 
neighbors. There is no indication in any of these allegations that defendant Weisz 
was feuding with the Cronins because Weisz was Jewish and the Cronins were 
Roman Catholic. For all that appears from the complaint’s factual allegations, Weisz 
was offended by the Cronins’ conduct, not by their faith. For all that appears, Weisz 
would have been just as offended by the Cronins’ alleged offensive behavior, public 
intoxication, basketball pole, trespass upon Weisz’s property and harassment of her 
children if the Cronins had also been Orthodox Jews; or for that matter, 
Episcopalians, Baptists, Mohammedans, Buddhists, agnostics, or atheists. 
Id. at 1054–55. 
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“add Jewish elements into the narrative, [but] they reflect nothing 
more than the defendant’s methods of making life miserable for the 
Cronins. They do not support an inference that Weisz wished to make 
life miserable for the Cronins because they were Roman 
Catholics.”107 As a result, Weisz held that the conduct alleged “does 
not fall within § 3617,”108 opining that a § 3617 complaint 
must allege conduct on the part of a defendant which in some 
way or other implicates the concerns expressed by Congress 
in the FHA. If it were otherwise, the FHA would federalize 
any dispute involving residences and people who live in 
them. Nothing in the statute or its legislative history supports 
so startling a proposition.109 
None of these cases produced an appellate decision, but the 
Eleventh Circuit did decide a case with somewhat similar facts in 
Sofarelli v. Pinellas County,110 which involved a white homeowner 
who allegedly was harassed by the defendant-neighbors because they 
feared he would rent to blacks.111 The district court dismissed 
Sofarelli’s § 3617 claim, but the court of appeals reversed, holding 
that the neighbors’ “leaving a note threatening ‘to break [Sofarelli] in 
half’ if he did not get out of the neighborhood and running up to one 
of Sofarelli’s trucks, hitting it, shouting obscenities and spitting at 
Sofarelli,” along with making racial slurs in a local newspaper, 
constituted actionable behavior under § 3617.112 In addition to 
Sofarelli, a number of appellate courts decided sex harassment cases 
that included § 3617 claims, but these decisions followed the lead of 
earlier sex-based cases in not providing a detailed analysis of the 
                                                                                                                  
107 Id. at 1055. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 1054. 
110 931 F.2d 718 (11th Cir. 1991). 
111 Id. at 720–21. Sofarelli’s complaint alleged that his efforts to transport his house by 
trailer had been interfered with by county officials and his prospective new neighbors. Id. at 
720. The claims against the county defendants, which were based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, were 
dismissed by the trial court, a ruling that was affirmed on appeal. Id. at 722–23. 
112 Id. at 721–22 (alteration in original). The defendant-neighbors stated in a local 
newspaper article that they “don’t want the house on their block partly because they’re afraid 
black people might move in,” and “What’s stopping him (Sofarelli) from selling it to coloreds? 
. . . Once that happens, the whole neighborhood is gone.” Id. at 722 (omission in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). In reversing the trial court’s dismissal of Sofarelli’s § 3617 
claim against these defendants, the Eleventh Circuit held that their alleged behavior “clearly 
constitute[s] coercion and intimidation under § 3617” and that, if the proof showed that the 
neighbors “interfered with the house move in order to prevent someone of a particular race from 
being able to move into their neighborhood, Sofarelli would be able to establish a colorable 
claim against them under the Fair Housing Act.” Id.  
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plaintiffs’ § 3617 claims separate from their § 3604 claims—both of 
which were thought to be governed by a “severe or pervasive” 
standard.113 
3. Summary of Neighbor Harassment Case Law 
Cases decided before Halprin generally recognized that minority 
homeowners could invoke § 3617 to challenge invidiously motivated 
harassment by their neighbors. Halprin jolted this consensus by 
suggesting that nothing in the FHA should be interpreted to provide 
protection for current residents unless they were forced out of their 
homes, but this suggestion was ultimately rejected by Bloch. 
After Bloch, the question has again become not whether neighbor 
harassment can justify a § 3617 claim, but how egregious such 
harassment must be. One HUD administrative decision in the 1990s 
held that a single hostile conversation could suffice; but many courts, 
including the Seventh Circuit in Bloch, opined that § 3617 should be 
interpreted to require sufficiently abusive or systematic behavior so as 
not to apply to simple neighborhood quarrels. 
But there are problems with this interpretation. To the extent this 
interpretation seeks to impose the same “severe or pervasive” 
standard on § 3617 that governs § 3604 sex harassment cases, it 
ignores the independence of § 3617 from the FHA’s other substantive 
provisions. In particular, it ignores the fact that the language in 
§ 3617 is quite different from the prohibition of discriminatory “terms 
and conditions” in § 3604(b) and Title VII, which is often invoked in 
the sex harassment cases.114 Furthermore, imposing a “severe or 
pervasive” standard on § 3617 ignores a key goal of the FHA: to 
                                                                                                                  
113 See, e.g., Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487, 491–92 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming HUD 
ALJ’s decision, described infra note 262, that landlord violated both §§ 3604(b) and 3617); 
DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008–09 (7th Cir. 1996) (ruling for defendant-landlord 
based on conclusion that his harassment of female tenant did not meet the “severe or pervasive” 
standard); Honce v. Vigel, 1 F.3d 1085, 1090 (10th Cir. 1993) (same); see also Reeves v. 
Carrollsburg Condo. Owners Ass’n, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) 
¶ 16,250, at 16,250.4–.6 (D.D.C. 1997), available at 1997 WL 1877201 (holding that the 
plaintiff established a prima facie case of hostile-environment sexual harassment by showing 
that the defendant’s conduct met the “severe or pervasive” standard); SCHWEMM, supra note 28, 
§ 11C:2 nn.35–36 (citing additional cases). Post-Halprin cases have followed the same pattern. 
See, e.g., Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 946–48 (8th Cir. 2010) (affirming decision against 
landlord under FHA’s basic prohibitions of housing harassment based on “severe or pervasive” 
standard as well as under § 3617).  
Like the pre-FHAA sex harassment cases, the defendants in these more modern cases were 
sued in their role as housing providers, not neighbors. E.g., Quigley, 598 F.3d at 944–45; 
Krueger, 115 F.3d at 489–90; DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1005–06; Honce, 1 F.3d at 1087–88. 
114 For more on this point, see infra text accompanying notes 214–25. 
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encourage integration and therefore presumably to protect minority 
families who make integrative moves.115 
To be true to the text of § 3617—and therefore presumably to 
Congress’s intent—a proper interpretation of § 3617 in neighbor 
harassment cases must determine whether the defendant’s behavior 
“interfere[d] with” the plaintiff’s “exercise or enjoyment of” a “right 
granted or protected” by §§ 3603–3606.116 These are the three 
elements that Bloch and other cases have recognized as required for a 
§ 3617 claim, along with the requirement that the defendant be 
motivated by an intent to discriminate.117 The next Part examines 
other sources that shed light on the meaning of these three elements 
of § 3617. 
III. MORE EVIDENCE ON WHAT § 3617 MEANS BY “TO INTERFERE 
WITH” THE “EXERCISE OR ENJOYMENT OF” A “RIGHT”  
PROTECTED BY §§ 3603–3606 
A. Overview 
Part II determined that some of the issues in neighbor harassment 
cases require a further analysis of the key phrases used in § 3617. 
This Part examines various sources of guidance as to the meaning of 
these phrases. Section B examines § 3617’s legislative history. 
Section C discusses HUD’s regulations interpreting the FHA. Section 
D explores additional § 3617 cases, beyond those involving neighbor-
on-neighbor harassment, as well as the Supreme Court’s 
interpretations of Title VII’s analogous provision. Section E considers 
First Amendment implications. Section F summarizes the insights 
derived from these sources. 
B. § 3617’s Legislative History 
The legislative history of § 3617 contains no statements that 
directly address the meaning of its key phrases, but some general 
comments were made about this provision’s purpose, and its textual 
evolution is worth recounting. Like most of the FHA’s other 
substantive prohibitions enacted in 1968, § 3617 changed very little 
during the two-year period that Congress dealt with this legislation.118 
                                                                                                                  
115 For more on this point, see infra text accompanying notes 144–48. 
116 For the full text of § 3617, see supra text accompanying note 29. 
117 See supra note 65 (quoting the test from Bloch). 
118 For a detailed description of this two-year process, see Robert G. Schwemm, 
Discriminatory Housing Statements and § 3604(c): A New Look at the Fair Housing Act’s Most 
Intriguing Provision, 29 FORD. URB. L.J. 187, 197–200 (2001). For a description of how the 
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The FHA’s legislative process began in 1966 when President Johnson 
proposed a fair housing bill,119 which included a provision almost 
identical to § 3617.120 Later in 1966, the House passed an amended 
version of the Johnson bill with no changes to this provision,121 but 
that bill failed in the Senate.122  
In 1967, Senator Mondale introduced a new fair housing bill that 
included some slight changes to § 3617’s predecessor.123 The 
substantive language of Mondale’s version of § 3617 was ultimately 
enacted in the 1968 FHA, reenacted in the 1988 FHAA, and remains 
in effect today.124 In early 1968, the Mondale bill was proposed as an 
amendment to another civil rights bill then pending on the Senate 
                                                                                                                  
 
FHA’s substantive provisions evolved, see id. at 200–06. 
119 The Johnson Administration’s proposal was embodied in two identical bills. S. 3296, 
89th Cong. (1966); H.R. 14765, 89th Cong. (1966). For the text of Senate Bill 3296, see 112 
CONG. REC. 9394–97 (1966). 
120 The bill’s version of § 3617 provided: 
No person shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or interfere with any person in the 
exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on 
account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or 
enjoyment of any right granted by section 403 or 404. 
112 CONG. REC. 9397 (1966). The enacted version provided: 
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the 
exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on 
account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or 
enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of 
this title. This section may be enforced by appropriate civil action. 
42 U.S.C. § 3617 (1970) (emphasis added) (emphasizing the differences between the two). 
121 See 112 CONG. REC. 18,739–40 (1966) (reporting the result of the roll-call vote for the 
amended version of House Bill 14765). 
122 See 112 CONG. REC. INDEX 1183 (1966) (describing House Bill 14765 and the Senate’s 
inability to pass a motion for cloture on the bill). 
123 S. 1358, 90th Cong. (1967). For the text of this bill, see Fair Housing Act of 1967: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & Urban Affairs of the S. Comm. on Banking & 
Currency on S. 1358, S. 2114, and S. 2280 Relating to Civil Rights and Housing, 90th Cong. 
439–59 (1967). Senate Bill 1358 was identical to the fair housing title of a civil rights bill 
proposed by the Johnson Administration in 1967 (Senate Bill 1026 and House Bill 5700), a 
copy of which is set forth in Civil Rights Act of 1967: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1026, S. 1318, S. 1359, S. 1362, S. 
1462, H.R. 2516 and H.R. 10805 Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1967, 90th Cong. 36–42 (1967). 
Apart from the needed changes in the numbers of the referenced sections within this 
provision, the Mondale version of § 3617 made only three changes to the original version, see 
supra note 120, which were: (1) to add “or protected” to “any right granted . . . by” these 
referenced sections; (2) to reorder the first three verbs; and (3) to change the introductory phrase 
regarding how such behavior was forbidden, a change that was also made to the other 
substantive provisions of the bill. 
124 See supra notes 29, 120. 
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floor.125 This amendment was later withdrawn in favor of a substitute 
fair housing proposal offered by Senator Dirksen,126 which, with 
minor amendments not relevant here, was eventually enacted.127 
Senator Dirksen’s version of § 3617 was substantively identical to the 
Mondale proposal.128 
The evolution of § 3617 shows that virtually all of its key language 
was in the original 1966 Johnson Administration proposal. What led 
the drafters of this proposal to choose this language? None of the 
Administration’s explanations regarding its proposed bill focused on 
the specific words or purpose of § 3617.129 A congressional analysis 
noted that it was “intended to protect Negroes and others from threats, 
etc., not only by parties to any negotiation or prospective transaction 
                                                                                                                  
125 See 114 CONG. REC. 2270–72 (1968) (proposal printed); id. at 2279 (amendment 
formally offered by Sen. Mondale). 
126 For the text of the Dirksen proposal, see 114 CONG. REC. 4570–73 (1968). 
127 See 114 CONG. REC. 9620–21 (1968) (House passage of Senate-passed version); 
Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks Upon Signing the Civil Rights Act (Apr. 11, 1968), in 1 PUBLIC 
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON: 1968–69, at 509–10 
(1970) (presidential signing). For a description of the Senate amendments, see Schwemm, supra 
note 118, at 205 n.76. 
128 See bills cited supra notes 119, 121, 123; see also 114 CONG. REC. 9612 (1968) (noting, 
in a comparative analysis of Dirksen’s Senate-passed version of § 3617 and the 1966 House-
passed version of this provision, that these versions were “comparable”). 
The Dirksen proposal did, however, relocate this provision toward the end of the statute 
and provided for its enforcement only by “appropriate civil action” rather than pursuant to the 
private enforcement procedures set up for other FHA violations. 114 CONG. REC. 4570–73 
(1968). All prior versions, beginning with the original Johnson Administration proposal, had 
placed § 3617’s predecessor immediately after the bill’s other substantive prohibitions and made 
all of these prohibitions subject to the FHA’s enforcement procedures. See bills cited supra 
notes 119, 121, 123. Senator Dirksen offered no explanation for these changes. See 114 CONG. 
REC. 4574 (1968) (statement of Sen. Dirksen). In any event, this change in § 3617 by Senator 
Dirksen was the one reversed by the 1988 FHAA, see supra note 29 and accompanying text, 
which means that the original Johnson Administration proposal regarding § 3617 is procedurally 
consistent with the modern version of this provision, as well as being nearly identical 
substantively. 
129 The Attorney General’s explanation of the overall bill included only general statements 
about coverage. 112 CONG. REC. 9399 (1966). With respect to the provision that became 
§ 3617, the Attorney General merely stated that this provision would “prohibit coercion, 
intimidation or interference with the right of a person to obtain housing and its financing 
without discrimination or to aid others in exercising such rights.” Id. With respect to the bill’s 
overall substantive provisions, he noted, “The bill would reach . . . such acts as mobs blocking a 
minority-group family from moving into a neighborhood . . . .” Id. The Attorney General also 
noted that a related title provided for criminal prosecutions for those who interfered by the use 
of force or the threat of force in “activities protected by Federal law or the Constitution.” Id. For 
more on this related criminal provision, see supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
In its 1968 analysis of the Dirksen proposal, the Justice Department simply listed the bill’s 
various prohibitions, including those contained in § 3617, without providing any additional 
explanation of their specific meaning. 114 CONG. REC. 4906–08 (1968). As for § 3617, the 
Justice Department stated, “The bill would also make it unlawful to coerce, intimidate threaten 
or interfere with persons seeking to exercise or enjoy the rights granted or protected by [this 
title].” Id. at 4908. 
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but from any third parties who seek to forestall the same” and that it 
“reaches similar conduct in retaliation for having negotiated the 
purchase or rental of a dwelling and/or for having consummated the 
same.”130 This analysis also noted that “there is some doubt whether 
[the other substantive] sections protect persons against retaliation 
because they have filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any 
proceeding under this title”131 and that “Congress on other occasions 
has expressly provided [such] a safeguard.”132 
But the language proposed for the FHA was significantly broader 
than the antiretaliation provisions in these other laws. For example, 
the comparable Title VII provision bars only employers and the three 
other entities covered by Title VII from discriminating against 
employees and other persons they deal with because those persons 
have “opposed any practice made . . . unlawful” by Title VII or made 
a charge or otherwise “participated in any manner in [a Title VII] 
investigation, proceeding, or hearing.”133 In contrast, the Johnson 
Administration’s proposal for what became § 3617 went beyond Title 
VII’s provision in two major ways by: (1) using four separate verbs to 
describe the forbidden behavior, rather than requiring a defendant “to 
discriminate against” someone; and (2) describing three types of 
protected activities that go beyond Title VII’s protection of those who 
have “opposed” unlawful practices or “participated” in Title VII 
proceedings.134 Under well-established principles of statutory 
construction, Congress’s decision to make these additions, once 
                                                                                                                  
130 112 CONG. REC. 18,117 (1966) (written submission of the Legislative Reference 
Service of the Library of Congress). 
131 Id. at 18,118. 
132 Id. As a footnote to this observation, the analysis cited the antiretaliation provisions of 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and a New York State 
fair housing law that outlawed “similar conduct.” Id. n.*; see also infra note 133 and 
accompanying text (quoting Title VII). 
133 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). For a discussion of Supreme Court cases interpreting 
this provision, see infra notes 216–30 and accompanying text. 
134 In addition, the proposal for § 3617 went beyond its Title VII counterpart in at least two 
more ways: (1) by making the behavior described unlawful, regardless of who engages in it; and 
(2) by describing the victim of such unlawful behavior as “any person,” instead of limiting 
protection to those in an employment or other business relationship with the defendant. 
A related piece of evidence that Congress intended to broaden the scope of § 3617 is the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621–634 (2006), which banned 
many of the same employment practices outlawed by Title VII if engaged in because of age, id. 
§ 623, and which included an antiretaliation provision that used language virtually identical to 
Title VII’s, id. § 623(d). Thus, in the same time period that Congress was adopting language for 
§ 3617 that went well beyond Title VII’s comparable provision, it was choosing not to make 
such additions to a different civil rights statute that it felt was more similar to, and should 
remain verbally consistent with, Title VII. 
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enacted, must be seen an intentional effort to add substantive 
coverage to the FHA’s provision.135 
Although not mentioned in the FHA’s legislative history, two 
other recently enacted civil rights statutes contained antiharassment 
provisions that were more similar to the language proposed in 1966 
for § 3617 than Title VII’s antiretaliation provision. One was Title II 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, whose prohibitions against 
discrimination in public accommodations were followed by a 
provision declaring that “[n]o person shall . . . intimidate, threaten, or 
coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person with 
the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege secured by [the 
substantive provisions] of this title.”136 The other was the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”), which made it unlawful for anyone to 
“intimidate, threaten, or coerce” any person for voting, attempting to 
vote, or “urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote,” or 
“exercising any power or duties under” the VRA’s other substantive 
provisions.137 
                                                                                                                  
135 These principles include, first and foremost, that a statute’s text is the primary source of 
its meaning. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue, 131 S. Ct. 1101, 1107 
(2011) (“We begin, as in any case of statutory interpretation, with the language of the statute.”) 
(citing Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 S.Ct. 2149, 2156 (2010))); Cmty. for 
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989) (“The starting point for [the] 
interpretation of a statute is always its language.” (citing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. 
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 44 U.S. 102, 108 (1980))). As a corollary, another basic tenet of statutory 
construction requires that every word or phrase in the text be accorded some meaning. See, e.g., 
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228–29 (2010) (invoking the “canon [of statutory 
interpretation] against interpreting any statutory provision in a manner that would render 
another provision superfluous” (citing Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1566 (2009))); 
Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2288 (2010) (“[W]e should not construe the statute in a 
manner that . . . would render a statutory term superfluous.” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 476 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955) (noting that a court must give effect, if 
possible, to every clause and word of a statute); see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. 
White, 548 U.S. 53, 62–63 (2006) (analyzing the language of Title VII’s substantive and 
antiretaliation provisions); supra note 60 (analyzing the language of § 3617). 
136 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2(b) (2006). For early cases decided under this provision, see United 
States v. Original Knights of Ku Klux Klan, 250 F. Supp. 330, 356 (E.D. La. 1965) (enjoining 
private individuals and organizations from engaging in behavior that “intimidated, harassed, and 
in other ways interfered with the civil rights of Negroes” in violation of Title II and other federal 
laws); United States v. Clark, 249 F. Supp. 720, 730 (S.D. Ala. 1965) (enjoining city and county 
law enforcement officials from interfering with blacks who asserted their Title II rights); see 
also United States v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 563 (1968) (upholding criminal convictions under 18 
U.S.C. § 241 of defendants who physically assaulted blacks seeking to exercise their Title II 
rights). Title II’s antiharassment provisions have produced few reported cases since the FHA’s 
enactment in 1968. 
137 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(b); see also id. § 1973j(c) (providing criminal sanctions for anyone 
who “interferes with any right secured by” the VRA). The VRA’s antiharassment provisions 
have produced few reported decisions. See, e.g., Olagues v. Russoniello, 770 F.2d 791, 804–05 
(9th Cir. 1985) (declining to recognize a private right of action for damages under § 1973i(b)). 
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This language in the VRA was described in an early § 3617 
decision as “essentially identical” to § 3617’s,138 but this is not 
accurate. Although use of the three verbs “intimidate, threaten, or 
coerce” in both the VRA and Title II does appear to have been copied 
in the 1966 proposal that became § 3617, the latter’s addition of a 
fourth verb—“interfere with”—along with its articulation of the 
activities protected are noteworthy differences. These changes must 
be considered important additions to a proper interpretion of 
§ 3617.139 As we have seen, § 3617’s addition of “interfere with” is 
particularly crucial to resolving the issue at the heart of this Article.140 
To summarize, the FHA’s § 3617 is now much like it was when 
originally proposed in 1966. It was described then as an antiretaliation 
provision comparable to Title VII’s,141 and indeed it does protect 
those who are later discriminated against for asserting their FHA 
rights.142 But § 3617’s broader language shows that it was intended to 
do much more. Whether this broader scope of § 3617 covers 
neighbor-on-neighbor harassment turns on two issues: (1) what types 
of behavior are included in the four verbs used—particularly 
“interfere with”; and (2) whether this behavior is directed at its target 
because the latter was engaged “in the exercise or enjoyment of” a 
“right granted or protected by” the FHA’s §§ 3603–3606. The 
legislative history of § 3617 provides little guidance in answering 
these questions.  
An additional comment about the FHA’s general legislative 
history is worth making here.143 As the Bloch opinion noted in 
construing § 3617 to apply to some types of neighbor harassment, 
such a construction is “consistent with Congress’ intent in enacting 
the FHA—‘the reach of the proposed law was to replace the ghettos 
by truly integrated and balanced living patterns.’”144 The Bloch court 
here was quoting the Supreme Court’s first FHA decision, Trafficante 
                                                                                                                  
138 Northside Realty Assocs., Inc. v. Chapman, 411 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (N.D. Ga. 1976). 
139 See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
140 See supra Part II.B. For additional discussion of the meaning of § 3617’s “interferes 
with” phrase, see infra Part III.D.2. 
141 See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
142 See infra notes 187–89 and accompanying text. 
143 See generally Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 
1605, 1615 (2010) (examining statute’s “context and history” in order to provide additional 
support for the Court’s reading of its text, and noting that “[i]n reading a statute we must not 
look merely to a particular clause, but consider in connection with it the whole statute” (quoting 
Dada v. Mukasey, 128 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
144 Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 782 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Trafficante v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972)). 
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v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,145 which in turn had quoted 
Senator Mondale as advocating this statute as a way of replacing the 
ghettos “by truly integrated and balanced living patterns.”146 Clearly, 
the goal of racial integration was important to the Congress that 
passed the 1968 FHA.147 As Bloch recognized, the congressional 
desire that the FHA result in integrated living patterns has important 
implications for the proper interpretation of § 3617 in neighbor-on-
neighbor harassment cases.148 This lesson will be further explored 
later.149 
C. HUD’s § 3617 Regulation 
In early 1989, HUD issued a lengthy set of FHA regulations that 
became effective along with the amendments adopted by the 1988 
FHAA on March 12, 1989.150 Each of the FHA’s substantive 
                                                                                                                  
145 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972). Trafficante was a unanimous decision upholding the standing 
of white residents of a large apartment complex to complain about their landlord’s racial 
discrimination against black applicants. For more on this case’s guides to interpreting the FHA, 
see infra note 201. 
146 Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 211 (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. 
Mondale)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 114 CONG. REC. 2276 (1968) (additional 
remarks of Senator Mondale decrying the prospect that “we are going to live separately in white 
ghettos and Negro ghettos”); id. at 2275–76, 2279 (additional remarks of Senator Mondale 
stating that the FHA reflects Congress’s commitment “to the principle of living together” and to 
promoting integrated neighborhoods where residents of difference races would live together in 
“harmony”). 
147 In addition to Senator Mondale’s comments, supra note 146 and accompanying text, 
proponents of the FHA in both the Senate and the House repeatedly argued that it was intended 
not only to expand housing choices for individual minorities, but also to foster racial integration 
for the benefit of all Americans. On the House side, for example, Congressman Cellar, the 
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, spoke of the need to eliminate the “blight of segregated 
housing and the pale of the ghetto,” 114 CONG. REC. 9559 (1968), and Congressman Ryan saw 
the FHA as a way to help “achieve the aim of an integrated society,” id. at 9591. According to 
Senator Javits, the intended beneficiaries of the FHA were not only blacks and other minority 
groups, but “the whole community.” Id. at 2706. In general, Congress was aware of the recently 
published conclusion of the National Commission on Civil Disorders that the nation was 
dividing into two racially separate societies, see SCHWEMM, supra note 28, § 5:2 nn.12–20 and 
accompanying text, and thus intended the FHA to remedy segregated housing patterns and the 
problems associated with them—segregated schools, lost suburban job opportunities for 
minorities, and the alienation of whites and blacks caused by the “lack of experience in actually 
living next to” each other. Id. at 2275 (statement of Senator Mondale); see also Linmark 
Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94–95 (1977) (stating that Congress in the 
FHA “made a strong national commitment to promote integrated housing” for the benefit of 
“both whites and blacks” (citing Trafficante, 409 U.S. 205)). For more on the integration theme 
in the FHA’s legislative history, see SCHWEMM, supra note 28, §§ 2:3, 7:3. 
148 Accord United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 977–78 (D. Neb. 2004) 
(interpreting § 3617 broadly based in part on recognition of Congress’s desire in the FHA to 
eliminate housing discrimination and to promote harmony in innercity neighborhoods). 
149 See infra notes 275–81 and accompanying text. 
150 See Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 
3232–3317 (Jan. 23, 1989) (codified at scattered parts of 24 C.F.R.).  
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provisions, including § 3617, was the subject of one or more of these 
regulations.151 Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s directive in Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,152 these 
regulations must be given substantial deference in interpreting the 
FHA153—i.e., courts must follow these regulations so long as they are 
a “permissible” or “reasonable” construction of the FHA.154 
The regulation interpreting § 3617 first tracks the statutory 
language of this provision and then identifies five types of conduct 
outlawed by § 3617.155 Among the types of conduct identified as 
unlawful, and the one most relevant to the problem of neighbor 
harassment, is: “Threatening, intimidating or interfering with persons 
in their enjoyment of a dwelling because of the race, color, religion, 
sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin of such persons, or of 
visitors or associates of such persons.”156 
                                                                                                                  
151 See 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.50–.148 (2010) (regulating discriminatory housing practices and 
residential real estate–related transactions). For a discussion of the § 3617 regulation, which 
appears in section 100.400, see infra notes 155–56 and accompanying text. 
152  467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
153 See, e.g., Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 287–88 (2003) (relying on HUD regulation to 
interpret the FHA). For a list of decisions that have accorded deference to HUD’s FHA 
regulations, see SCHWEMM, supra note 28, § 7:5 n.17. For more on Chevron deference in the 
context of § 3617 cases involving neighbor harassment, see infra notes 263–67 and 
accompanying text. 
154 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–45 (instructing that unless “Congress has directly spoken 
to the precise question at issue”—i.e., the statute “unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress”—courts are to follow an agency’s regulations so long as they are a “permissible” or 
“reasonable” construction of the statute, giving them “controlling weight unless they are 
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute”).  
155 See 24 C.F.R. § 100.400. The five types of unlawful conduct are identified in 
subsection (c) of this regulation, which states that the conduct made unlawful by § 3617 
“includes, but is not limited to” these five examples. Id. § 100.400(c).  
156 Id. § 100.400(c)(2). The four other types of unlawful conduct identified in this 
regulation are: 
(1) Coercing a person, either orally, in writing, or by other means, to deny or 
limit the benefits provided that person in connection with the sale or rental of a 
dwelling or in connection with a residential real estate-related transaction because of 
race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. . . . 
(3) Threatening an employee or agent with dismissal or an adverse employment 
action, or taking such adverse employment action, for any effort to assist a person 
seeking access to the sale or rental of a dwelling or seeking access to any residential 
real estate-related transaction, because of the race, color, religion, sex, handicap, 
familial status, or national origin of that person or of any person associated with that 
person. 
(4) Intimidating or threatening any person because that person is engaging in 
activities designed to make other persons aware of, or encouraging such other 
persons to exercise, rights granted or protected by this part. 
(5) Retaliating against any person because that person has made a complaint, 
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in a proceeding under the Fair 
Housing Act. 
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In connection with issuing its FHA regulations, HUD also 
published extensive comments on these regulations. The comments 
relating to the § 3617 regulation noted that the conduct outlawed by 
this provision can “involve harassment of persons because of race [or 
other prohibited factor],”157 and that the regulation’s illustrations of 
prohibited conduct “indicate that a broad range of activities can 
constitute a discriminatory housing practice.”158 The HUD 
commentary also stated that “persons who are not involved in any 
aspect of the sale or rental of a dwelling are nonetheless prohibited 
from engaging in conduct to coerce, intimidate, threaten or interfere 
with persons in connection with protected activities.”159 
This last comment reflects § 3617’s legislative history and 
confirms prior case law holding that neighbors’ conduct may be 
subject to § 3617.160 Also, in outlawing invidiously motivated 
interference with “persons in their enjoyment of a dwelling,”161 
HUD’s regulation provided important support for the proposition that 
                                                                                                                  
 
Id. § 100.400(c). 
Paragraph (1) may apply to neighbor harassment, but it is limited to “coercing” behavior, 
whereas paragraph (2), see supra text accompanying note 155, uses § 3617’s other three verbs 
(i.e., “threatening, intimidating or interfering with”). Paragraphs (3) and (4) deal with situations 
where the target of the unlawful behavior is a housing provider or other person engaged in 
“aiding or encouraging” others to exercise their FHA rights. For more on this type of § 3617 
case, see infra notes 176 and 182–85 and accompanying text. Paragraph (5) deals with 
retaliation against persons who have filed or helped with FHA complaints. For more on this type 
of § 3617 case, see infra notes 187–89 and accompanying text. 
157 Implementation of Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3257 (Jan. 23, 
1989) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100). 
158 Id. Among such prohibited activities, the HUD commentary identified: “Threatening or 
intimidating actions include acts against the possessions of persons, such as damage to 
automobiles or vandalism, which limit a person’s ability to have full enjoyment of a dwelling.” 
Id. 
159 Id. 
160 For a discussion of § 3617’s legislative history, see supra note 129; supra text 
accompanying note 130. For prior case law involving neighbors’ conduct, see supra notes 72–
76 and 80–81 and accompanying text. 
Given the fact that the 1988 FHAA reenacted verbatim § 3617’s substantive prohibitions, 
see supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text, Congress presumably intended to incorporate 
settled judicial interpretations into the meaning of this provision. See, e.g., Jerman v. Carlisle, 
McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 1616 (2010) (“We have often observed 
that when ‘judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision, 
repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to 
incorporate its . . . judicial interpretations as well.’” (omission in original) (quoting Bragdon v. 
Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998))). For purposes of this doctrine, a settled judicial 
interpretation may be based on a limited number of lower court opinions. See id. (employing 
this doctrine based on three federal appellate decisions). 
161 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2); see also supra note 158 (setting forth HUD commentary that 
actions in violation of § 3617 include those that “limit a person’s ability to have full enjoyment 
of a dwelling”). 
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current residents may invoke § 3617’s protections. Again, this 
proposition simply reflected § 3617’s prior case law and general 
legislative history,162 but reinforcing this view apparently was 
necessary, as demonstrated by some courts’ subsequent willingness to 
ignore these sources and suggest that § 3617 did not apply to 
neighbor-on-neighbor or any other form of postacquisition 
harassment.163 
Unfortunately, one thing HUD’s regulation and commentary on 
§ 3617 did not do was to give any significant insight into the meaning 
of the four verbs used in this provision to define the behavior it bans. 
Thus, for example, the HUD regulation that is most relevant to 
neighbor harassment simply parrots the statutory language by 
outlawing “[t]hreatening, intimidating, or interfering with” persons in 
the enjoyment of their homes.164 True, the concept of “enjoyment” 
mentioned here as the key to § 3617’s scope may have implications 
for how “interfere with” and the other verbs used should be 
interpreted, as does HUD’s commentary that “a broad range of 
activities” may violate § 3617.165 But these are merely suggestive; the 
fact is that HUD has not provided a working definition for § 3617’s 
verbs. For guidance on this issue, we must turn to other sources. 
D. Precedents from Other Types of § 3617 Cases and  
Title VII’s Analogous Provision 
1. Overview: § 3617’s Independence from §§ 3603–3606 Violations 
In addition to neighbor-on-neighbor harassments cases, § 3617 has 
produced two other distinct types of claims.166 One is brought by 
housing providers who claim that their efforts to help protected-class 
members have been interfered with in violation of § 3617’s protection 
                                                                                                                  
162 See supra notes 47, 49, 82 and accompanying text (prior case law allowing current 
residents to invoke § 3617); supra notes 144–49 and accompanying text (legislative history of 
the FHA); see also supra note 160 (prior case law and legislative history suggesting that 
neighbors’ conduct is subject to § 3617). 
163 See supra notes 44–45, 48 and accompanying text (discussing case law that interprets 
§ 3617 as not extending to postacquisition disputes). 
164 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2). 
165 Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3257 (Jan. 
23, 1989) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100); see also supra text accompanying note 158 
(discussing HUD’s commentary on its § 3617 regulation). 
166 In addition, some § 3617 cases do not fit neatly into any of these categories. See, e.g., 
United States v. Am. Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers, 442 F. Supp. 1072, 1079 (N.D. Ill. 1977) 
(upholding § 3617 claim against certain appraisal organizations that were accused of supporting 
the practice of evaluating houses based in part on racial demographics and observing that § 3617 
has been “broadly applied to reach all practices which have the effect of interfering with the 
exercise of rights under the Act”), appeal dismissed, 590 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1978). 
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of persons who have “aided or encouraged” others in the exercise or 
enjoyment of their FHA rights.167 Another type of § 3617 claim is 
analogous to retaliation claims under Title VII,168 and thus reflects 
§ 3617’s historical link to Title VII’s antiretaliation provision.169 This 
type of claim alleges harm suffered as a result of the plaintiff having 
filed or otherwise helped with a FHA complaint.170 All types of 
§ 3617 cases have had occasion to interpret what § 3617 means by 
“interfere with” and what this provision’s relationship to §§ 3603–
3606 “rights” should be. 
The relationship of a § 3617 claim to the provisions it refers to has 
never been clear.171 As late as 2004, Judge Posner suggested that 
§ 3617 could not extend beyond violations of §§ 3603–3606.172 
Although this view was subsequently corrected in Bloch,173 decisions 
in the post-Bloch era still occasionally opine, albeit wrongly, that a 
plaintiff is not permitted “to assert a § 3617 claim without 
establishing a viable claim as to a substantive violation of rights 
protected under the statute.”174 
One reason for this confusion is that a large portion of § 3617 
cases, including Halprin and Bloch,175 have challenged behavior that 
allegedly violated both § 3617 and one or more of the FHA’s other 
provisions, with the courts generally focusing primarily on the non-
§ 3617 claims. Examples include many early FHA cases brought by 
housing developers in their role as “aiders” of minorities’ housing 
rights. These cases often involved a defendant-municipality’s refusal 
to allow construction of affordable housing for minorities. The refusal 
was challenged as violating §§ 3603–3606 as well as “interfering 
                                                                                                                  
167 For more on this type of § 3617 claim, see infra notes 177, 183–86 and accompanying 
text. 
168 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (outlawing discrimination against employees “for 
making charges, testifying, assisting, or participating” in proceedings under Title VII). For more 
on the meaning of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision, see infra notes 216–30 and 
accompanying text. 
169 See supra note 132 and accompanying text (noting the discussion of Title VII’s 
antiretaliation provision in the legislative history of § 3617). 
170 For more on such retaliation claims under § 3617, see infra notes 187–89 and 
accompanying text. 
171 See, e.g., United States v. Weisz, 914 F. Supp. 1050, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(commenting, almost thirty years after passage of the FHA, that “[t]he necessity of a nexus 
between § 3617 and the sections enumerated therein is not free from doubt”). 
172 Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 330 
(7th Cir. 2004). 
173 See supra notes 60–66 and accompanying text (discussing Bloch). 
174 H & J Consulting Servs., LLC v. City of Gainesville, Ga., No. 2:08-CV-0028-WCO, 
slip op. at 19 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 26, 2010). 
175 See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing Halprin); supra note 53 and 
accompanying text (discussing Bloch). 
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with” the developer and its prospective tenants in violation of 
§ 3617.176 In such cases where the plaintiffs prevailed, courts 
typically noted that their finding of § 3617 liability was based solely 
on the defendant’s violation of another FHA provision, usually 
§ 3604(a).177 Similarly, in cases where the defendants prevailed, a 
number of decisions gave short shrift to the § 3617 claim once the 
court determined that no violation of the FHA’s other substantive 
prohibitions had occurred.178 Thus, the § 3617 claim in these cases 
turned out, as a practical matter, to be superfluous. For some courts in 
the 1970s, this raised the question whether a § 3617 violation could 
                                                                                                                  
176 See, e.g., United States v. City of Birmingham, Mich., 727 F.2d 560, 561 (6th Cir. 
1984) (city prevented the development of low-income senior-citizen and family housing); 
United States v. City of Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d 1179, 1181 (8th Cir. 1974) (city charged 
with passing a zoning ordinance that interfered with the right of equal housing opportunity); 
United States v. City of Parma, Ohio, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1095–1101 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (city 
persistently resisted construction of low-income housing), aff’d as modified on other grounds, 
661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981); land-use cases cited infra notes 177–78; see also Malone v. City 
of Fenton, Mo., 592 F. Supp. 1135, 1156 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (holding that plaintiff-developer has 
standing under § 3617’s “interference with persons who aid” language), aff’d without opinion, 
794 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1986); U.S. General, Inc. v. City of Joliet, 432 F. Supp. 346, 352 (N.D. 
Ill. 1977) (holding, in case brought by housing developer, that “§ 3617 grants a right of action to 
persons who have been interfered with as they aided others in their exercise of rights protected 
by § 3604”). 
177 E.g., Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1288 (7th 
Cir. 1977) (noting that the defendant’s violation of § 3617 depends on § 3604(a)); Atkins v. 
Robinson, 545 F. Supp. 852, 865–866 (E.D. Va. 1982) (noting that the validity of the § 3617 
claim depends “on whether the defendants’ veto of the proposed development ran afoul of 
§ 3604” (citing Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d at 1288 n.5)), aff’d, 733 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 
1984); see also Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Mid-Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 472 F. Supp. 1106, 1111 
(S.D. Ohio 1979) (holding that the defendant’s insurance redlining, having been found to violate 
§ 3604, “also violates § 3617”). 
178 E.g., Burrell v. City of Kankakee, 815 F.2d 1127, 1130–31 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that 
the plaintiffs asserted that the city violated their rights under §§ 3604 and 3617, but deciding for 
the defendants after finding that “the evidence does not support a violation of Section 3604(a)”); 
Anderson v. City of Alpharetta, 737 F.2d 1530, 1531–32 n.2 (11th Cir. 1984) (implicitly 
applying the same standard for both §§ 3604 and 3617); Malone, 592 F. Supp. at 1165–66 
(“[T]his Court will not separately analyze plaintiffs’ § 3617 claim because the § 3604(a) 
analysis applies equally to said claim.”); see also Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass’n 
v. Cnty. of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1210 n.4 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that, in a case alleging that 
residents of minority neighborhood were harmed by county’s failure to maintain its tax 
delinquent properties in the plaintiffs’ neighborhood, plaintiffs’ § 3617 and § 3604(a) claims 
could be analyzed together). 
For more modern versions of the same phenomenon, see Maki v. Laakko, 88 F.3d 361, 
365 (6th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ § 3617 claim after holding against their § 3604 
claim on the ground that the “harassment claim . . . does nothing to advance their discrimination 
claim”); AHF Cmty. Dev., LLC v. City of Dallas, 633 F. Supp. 2d 287, 302–03 (N.D. Tex. 
2009) (agreeing with the defendant in exclusionary-zoning case that plaintiff-developer, having 
lost on its § 3604(a) and (b) claims, cannot pursue a § 3617 claim); infra note 249 and 
accompanying text (citing additional cases that preclude a § 3617 claim if a violation of § 3604 
is not proven). 
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occur without the defendant’s conduct having also violated §§ 3603–
3606.179 
Many early FHA decisions, however, did recognize that § 3617 
creates a cause of action independent of the statute’s other substantive 
provisions.180 The most important of these was the Ninth Circuit’s 
1975 decision in Smith v. Stechel,181 which upheld a § 3617 claim by 
two apartment managers who had been fired for not carrying out their 
employer’s orders not to rent to minorities.182 
As the Stechel opinion pointed out, this type of case involves a 
situation where the minorities’ §§ 3603–3606 rights “have actually 
been respected by persons who suffer consequent retaliation,”183 and 
thus the plaintiffs come within that part of § 3617 that protects 
                                                                                                                  
179 See, e.g., Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d at 1288 n.5 (“We decline to decide 
whether section 3617 can ever be violated by conduct that does not violate any of the four 
earlier sections.”); Dunn, 472 F. Supp. at 1111 (“It is unclear whether a violation of § 3617 can 
be established without first establishing a violation of §§ 3604, 3605 or 3606.”). 
180 See, e.g., Warner v. Perrino, 585 F.2d 171, 173 (6th Cir. 1978) (“Section 3617 provides 
a separate cause of action . . . .”); Smith v. Stechel, 510 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1975) 
(“Section 3617 does not necessarily deal with a discriminatory housing practice . . . .”); New 
York ex rel. Abrams v. Merlino, 694 F. Supp. 1101, 1103–04 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“[E]ven if a 
claim is not made out under §§ 3603–3606, a claim may still be maintained pursuant to 
§ 3617 . . . .”); Stackhouse v. DeSitter, 620 F. Supp. 208, 210 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (“We now hold 
that § 3617 may be violated absent a violation of § 3603, 3604, 3605 or 3606.”); Laufman v. 
Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 497–98 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (commenting that “a 
reasonable and practical interpretation of § 3617” allows for an independent violation); see also 
Malone, 592 F. Supp. at 1166 (recognizing in dicta that “[t]here are situations where a § 3617 
violation may occur without a violation of § 3604(a)”); cases cited infra notes 185, 188 (dealing 
on the merits with claims based solely on § 3617). 
181 510 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1975). 
182 Id. at 1163–64. According to the Stechel opinion, § 3617 was the only FHA provision 
“applicable to the facts of this case.” Id. at 1164. The Ninth Circuit then noted: 
Section 3617 does not necessarily deal with a discriminatory housing practice, or 
with the landlord, financer or brokerage service guilty of such practice. It deals with 
a situation where no discriminatory housing practice may have occurred at all 
because the would-be tenant has been discouraged from asserting his rights, or 
because the rights have actually been respected by persons who suffer consequent 
retaliation. It also deals with situations in which the fundamental inequity of a 
discriminatory housing practice is compounded by coercion, intimidation, threat or 
interference. 
Id. 
In Stechel, the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court’s decision to dismiss the plaintiffs’ 
§ 3617 claims for being untimely under the FHA’s private enforcement provisions. Id. Stechel 
held that, unlike claims under §§ 3603–3606, § 3617 was not made subject to the limitations 
period of these other provisions. Id.; accord Warner, 585 F.2d at 173 (noting that § 3617 
includes no time limitation); Merlino, 694 F. Supp. at 1103 (“There is persuasive authority for 
the proposition that Congress ‘designedly’ refrained from including § 3617 within the limitation 
period of § 3612 . . . .”). As described above, the 1968 FHA’s alternative enforcement system 
for § 3617 claims was later eliminated by the 1988 amendments to this statute. For a discussion 
of the 1988 changes, see supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
183 510 F.2d at 1164. 
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persons who are harmed “on account of . . . having aided or 
encouraged” others in exercising their FHA rights.184 After Stechel, a 
number of other decisions upheld such “aided or encouraged” claims 
by real estate agents who were fired or otherwise harmed for not 
discriminating against minorities.185 These holdings were confirmed 
in HUD’s 1989 regulation dealing with § 3617, which specifically 
outlaws “adverse employment actions” against employees and agents 
for assisting others in obtaining housing free from discrimination.186 
Another situation in which a § 3617 claim may arise without a 
violation of the FHA’s other substantive provisions involves 
retaliation against someone who has filed or otherwise participated in 
a FHA proceeding.187 Only a few such § 3617 cases were reported 
before passage of the 1988 FHAA,188 but many more have occurred 
since then.189 
The exact relationship between § 3617 and the substantive 
provisions it refers to will be discussed in greater detail later.190 For 
now, it seems clear, based on HUD’s regulations and case law, that a 
§ 3617 claim may be made without an outright violation of §§ 3603–
3606.191 This is crucial for neighbor-on-neighbor harassment cases. 
                                                                                                                  
184 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2006). For the full text of § 3617, see supra text accompanying note 
29. 
185 See, e.g., Wilkey v. Pyramid Constr. Co., 619 F. Supp. 1453, 1455 (D. Conn. 1985) 
(allowing a rental agent who “refus[ed] to execute her employer’s allegedly racially 
discriminatory housing policies” to invoke § 3617); Meadows v. Edgewood Mgmt. Corp., 432 
F. Supp. 334, 337 (W.D. Va. 1977) (holding that, although a cause of action exists for retaliation 
for aid and encouragement, the resident-apartment-manager plaintiffs failed to prove their case 
by a preponderance of the evidence); Tokaji v. Toth, 1 EOHC Rep. (P-H) ¶ 13,679 (N.D. Ohio 
1974) (denying the defendant-landlord’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss claim brought by managers 
of an apartment building he owned for allegedly evicting them after they refused to follow his 
policy of not renting to blacks); see also Vercher v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 454 F. Supp. 423, 
424 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (stating that a city housing social services coordinator “discharged for his 
efforts to secure fair housing rights for others . . . would clearly have a cause of action under 
§ 3617”). 
186 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(3) (2010). For the full text of § 100.400(c)(3), see supra note 
156. 
187 HUD’s regulation recognizes § 3617’s coverage of this situation, see supra note 156 
(quoting 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(5)), and reflects § 3617’s historical link to Title VII’s 
antiretaliation provision, see supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
188 Two of the few examples were Izard v. Arndt, 483 F. Supp. 261, 264–65 (E.D. Wis. 
1980) (dismissing § 3617 claims by fair housing organization and its director based on 
landlords’ suit against them allegedly for helping a black couple bring FHA claims against the 
landlords), and Meadows, 432 F. Supp. at 336–37 (rejecting for lack of factual support § 3617 
claim by apartment managers who were fired allegedly for helping black tenant assert her FHA 
rights by filing a HUD complaint). 
189 See, e.g., SCHWEMM, supra note 28, § 20:5 nn.2–3 (collecting cases); cases cited supra 
note 99; infra notes 196–205 and accompanying text. 
190 See infra Part III.D.3. 
191 Several post-FHAA cases have also endorsed this proposition, including Bloch. See 
Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 1126–31 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. City of 
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The would-be defendants in such cases are often not themselves 
housing providers, i.e., could generally not be the target of a §§ 3603–
3606 claim for, say, making housing “unavailable” under § 3604(a) or 
for imposing discriminatory “terms or conditions” under § 3604(b).192 
In the most violent types of neighbor abuse, as illustrated by Judge 
Posner’s arson hypothetical in Halprin,193 the offending behavior may 
be so severe that it “constructively evicts” the minority plaintiffs from 
their home, thereby prompting a § 3604(a) “make unavailable” claim 
as well as a § 3617 “interference” claim.194 Short of such an extreme 
                                                                                                                  
 
Hayward, 36 F.3d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 1994); Sofarelli v. Pinellas Cnty., 931 F.2d 718, 722 (11th 
Cir. 1991); United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 978–79 (D. Neb. 2004); United States 
v. Pospisil, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1063–64 (W.D. Mo. 2000); Fowler v. Borough of Westville, 
97 F. Supp. 2d 602, 613 n.7 (D.N.J. 2000); Egan v. Schmock, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1092–93 
(N.D. Cal. 2000); Ohana v. 180 Prospect Place Realty Corp., 996 F. Supp. 238, 239–43 
(E.D.N.Y. 1998); United States v. Scott, 788 F. Supp. 1555, 1562 (D. Kan. 1992); Johnson v. 
Smith, 810 F. Supp. 235, 238–39 (N.D. Ill. 1992); HUD v. Weber, Fair Housing–Fair Lending 
Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,041, at 25,424 (HUD ALJ 1993), available at 1993 WL 246392; 
case cited supra notes 61–65 and accompanying text; cf. Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. 
White, 548 U.S. 53, 59–67 (2006) (interpreting Title VII’s antiretaliation provision separately 
from the statute’s other substantive provisions). 
Decisions to the contrary continue to be issued within the Fifth Circuit, which initially 
chose to follow Halprin, see supra note 48 and accompanying text, and has not yet corrected 
this position with a Bloch-like decision. See, e.g., AHF Cmty. Dev., LLC v. City of Dallas, 633 
F. Supp. 2d 287, 302–03 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (citing Reule v. Sherwood Valley I Council of Co-
Owners, Inc., 235 Fed. App’x 227 (5th Cir. 2007) (described supra note 59)); McZeal v. Ocwen 
Fin. Corp., 252 F.3d 1355, 2001 WL 422375, at *2 (5th Cir. 2001) (unpublished per curiam 
decision stating that “[b]ecause his § 3605 claim fails, [plaintiff’s] claim under § 3617 must also 
fail”); see also Petty v. Portofino Council of Coowners, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 721, 728–30 (S.D. 
Tex. 2010) (following Cox in holding that § 3617, along with § 3604(a) and (b), requires that a 
defendant’s conduct affect “the availability of housing, not merely the habitability of housing,” 
but finding the plaintiffs’ complaint adequate in alleging that the defendant made its 
condominium complex unavailable on a nondiscriminatory basis). 
192 See supra text accompanying notes 31–32 (quoting these provisions in full); cf. Woods 
v. Foster, 884 F. Supp. 1169, 1175 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (suggesting that sexual-harassment claim 
against nonprofit homeless shelter may be more appropriate under § 3617 than § 3604(a) 
because the former provision “is not limited to acts of ‘sale’ or ‘rental’”). In some situations, 
however, would-be defendants are both neighbors and housing-opportunity providers. For 
example, in both Halprin and Bloch, the defendants were neighbors as well as officers of a 
condominium board or the local homeowners’ association. See supra note 40 and 
accompanying text (discussing Halprin); supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing 
Bloch). This also often occurs in sex harassment cases where the defendant is a landlord 
who lives near the plaintiff. See supra note 113. 
193 See supra note 40. 
194 Another, albeit nonviolent, example of how similar conduct might violate §§ 3604 and 
3617 is provided in the HUD regulations, which identify, as respective §§ 3604(a) and 3617 
violations, “[d]ischarging or taking other adverse action against an employee, broker or agent 
because he or she refused to participate in a discriminatory housing practice” and “[t]hreatening 
an employee or agent with dismissal or an adverse employment action, or taking such adverse 
employment action, for any effort to assist a person seeking” nondiscriminatory access to 
housing. 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.70(d)(1), 100.400(c)(3) (2010). This example also demonstrates, 
however, how a § 3617 violation may occur without a corresponding § 3604 violation (e.g., 
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example, however, a minority family who is the target of a neighbor’s 
invidiously motivated harassment may well not have a claim against 
that neighbor under any FHA provision other than § 3617. 
2. The Meaning of “Interfere With” in § 3617 and  
Title VII’s Analogous Provision 
The problem here is to determine how egregious a neighbor’s 
conduct toward a minority resident must be before it “interferes with” 
that persons’s fair housing rights in violation of § 3617. Courts in 
other types of § 3617 cases generally agree that an interference claim 
need not involve violent behavior and at least some forms of verbal 
abuse will suffice.195 Beyond this, however, judicial opinions have 
expressed quite different views about how broadly § 3617’s 
“interferes with” phrase should be interpreted. Two decisions in 
§ 3617 retaliation cases illustrate this difference. 
In Walker v. City of Lakewood,196 the Ninth Circuit adopted an 
expansive view of “interferes with” in overturning summary 
judgment against a fair housing organization that claimed the 
defendant-city violated § 3617 by not renewing a contract with the 
plaintiff in retaliation for the latter’s participation in a FHA suit.197 
The Ninth Circuit first held that the plaintiff-organization (referred to 
as “FHF”) was engaged in the § 3617-protected activity of “aiding or 
encouraging” others in the exercise of their FHA rights.198 The court 
then decided that the adverse action that FHF suffered as a result of 
the defendant’s nonrenewal of its contract qualified as “interference” 
under § 3617.199 The rationale for this conclusion included three 
points: (1) that the Supreme Court has directed that the FHA’s 
language should be broadly construed;200 (2) that the language used in 
                                                                                                                  
 
when the adverse employment action is only threatened, but not actually carried out). 
195 In addition to Walker and Hayward, discussed infra notes 196–204 and accompanying 
text and note 203, respectively, see, for example, Fowler v. Borough of Westville, 97 F. Supp. 
2d 602, 613–14 (D.N.J. 2000) (finding that threat or use of force was not necessary to maintain 
a claim); People Helpers, Inc. v. City of Richmond, 789 F. Supp. 725, 733 n.5 (E.D. Va. 1992) 
(same, but in summary-judgment context); People Helpers Found., Inc. v. City of Richmond, 
781 F. Supp. 1132, 1135–36 (E.D. Va. 1992) (same, but in the context of a 12(b)(6) motion); 
cases cited supra notes 95–96 (same); see also Mich. Prot. & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 18 
F.3d 337, 347 (6th Cir. 1994) (“Section 3617 is not limited to those who used some sort of 
‘potent force or duress’ . . . .”). 
196 272 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2001). 
197 Id. at 1128–31. 
198 Id. at 1128. 
199 Id. at 1128–30. 
200 Id. at 1129 (citing Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972)). The 
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§ 3617, in contrast to the related criminal provision in § 3631, does 
not require “a showing of force or violence for coercion, interference, 
intimidation, or threats to give rise to liability;”201 and (3) that, in 
determining the “plain meaning” of the four triggering verbs in 
§ 3617, dictionary definitions should be consulted, and such 
definitions were broad enough to encompass the defendant’s 
behavior.202 As for the third point, Walker quoted a prominent 
dictionary from the time of the 1968 FHA that defined “interference” 
as “the act of meddling in or hampering an activity or process.”203 
                                                                                                                  
 
Supreme Court’s conclusion in Trafficante that the FHA carries out a “policy that Congress 
considered to be of the highest priority” and should be given “a generous construction,” 409 
U.S. at 210–12, was reaffirmed in City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731 
(1995). See also Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 290 (2003) (agreeing that the FHA’s objective 
is an “overriding societal priority”); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380 (1982) 
(noting the FHA’s “broad remedial intent”). 
201 Walker, 272 F.3d at 1128. For more on § 3631, see supra notes 36–37 and 
accompanying text. 
202 Walker, 272 F.3d at 1128–29; see also People Helpers Found., Inc. v. City of 
Richmond, 789 F. Supp. 725, 733 n.5 (E.D. Va. 1992) (providing broad interpretation of 
interference under § 3617 based on view that its words “mean exactly what they say”); People 
Helpers Found., Inc. v. City of Richmond, 781 F. Supp. 1132, 1135–36 (E.D. Va. 1992) (same). 
Walker’s interpretive technique reflects the modern Supreme Court’s regular practice of 
relying on definitions in dictionaries that were commonly used at the time of a law’s enactment 
to help interpret words in civil rights and other statutes. See, e.g., Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of 
Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 129 S. Ct. 846, 850 (2009) (interpreting Title VII); Burlington N. 
& Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 60 (2006) (same); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State 
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69 n.9 (1989) (interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983); 
Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610–11 (1987) (interpreting the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866). The theory is that Congress intends a statute’s words to bear their contemporary 
common meaning. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226 (2010) (“[U]nless 
otherwise defined [in the statute], words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, 
contemporary, common meaning.” (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (“In the absence 
of [a statutory] definition, we construe a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary and 
natural meaning.” (citing Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993))); see also MCI 
Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 228 (1994) (relying, in choosing among 
various dictionary definitions of the relevant term in a statute, primarily on those dictionaries 
that were available at the time of the statute’s enactment). 
203 Walker, 272 F.3d at 1129 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 1178 
(14th ed. 1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Walker opinion also noted that a prior 
Ninth Circuit opinion dealing with § 3617 had “explained that ‘interference,’ in particular, ‘has 
been broadly applied to reach all practices which have the effect of interfering with the exercise 
of rights under the federal fair housing laws. ’” Id. (quoting United States v. City of Hayward, 
36 F.3d 832, 835 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
In Hayward, the Ninth Circuit upheld a § 3617 claim that accused the defendant-city of 
ordering a mobile-home-park owner (Borello) to reduce rents under the city’s rent-control 
ordinance following the park’s termination of its adults-only policy. Hayward held that the rent 
reduction “interfered with” Borello on account of its having encouraged families with children 
to live there. 36 F.3d at 835. After citing a number of § 3617 cases where “[c]ourts have found 
various types of conduct to constitute ‘interference,’” id., the Hayward opinion rejected a 
number of the defendant’s arguments opposing § 3617’s applicability to its rent-reduction order. 
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Applying this definition to the facts at hand, the Ninth Circuit held 
that FHF’s evidence “demonstrates that the City ‘interfered,’ or 
meddled, with its ability to conduct its fair housing activities.”204 
Walker also opined that the City’s conduct, “while certainly 
interference, might also be considered coercion or threats.”205 
                                                                                                                  
 
Among these failed arguments was that 
there was no “interference” because the [City]’s decision did not cause [Borello] to 
change the park’s policies or practices. Section 3617 does not require one such as 
Borello who is interfered with to capitulate to the interference. . . . In response to 
terminating a discriminatory practice, the City penalized Borello by forcing Borello 
to forego a portion of its income with no corresponding savings in costs. This alone 
was sufficient as a matter of law to constitute interference. 
Id. at 836. 
In Michigan Protection & Advocacy Service, Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 1994), a 
case that the Hayward court cited, the Sixth Circuit rejected various FHA claims against 
neighbors by an organization whose efforts to operate a group home for disabled persons in their 
area were frustrated when the neighbors bought the desired property at a higher price than the 
organization had offered. Id. at 341–48. As for the § 3617 claim, the Sixth Circuit, though 
recognizing this provision’s breadth as quoted above, id. at 347, did “not believe that the 
neighbors’ act of purchasing the house constituted ‘interference’ within the meaning of the 
FHAA,” id. at 348. The Babin opinion conceded that the neighbors’ actions may have 
“interfered with” the plaintiff-organization’s ability to obtain the property, but “this interference 
is not direct enough to warrant a finding of liability,” because “the neighbors’ actions did not 
prevent [the plaintiff] from . . . continuing to bid for the property.” Id. Thus, Babin held that the 
type of “interference” that takes the form merely of economic competition by third-party bidders 
is not actionable under § 3617. 
204 Walker, 272 F.3d at 1129. In support of this conclusion, Walker noted the following: 
The City supervised the [FHF] more closely than it had before, by sending city 
officials to monthly meetings, and also asked the FHF to “curtail the amount of 
exposure” it gave discrimination complaints. Additionally, the City contacted other 
cities to complain about the FHF and also filed suit against the FHF for breach of 
contract, which required time and money to defend. Lastly, the City refused to renew 
the FHF’s contract, which altogether prevented the organization from working in 
Lakewood. 
Id. at 1129 (footnote omitted) (citing Cal. Acrylic Indus. Inc. v. NLRB, 150 F.3d 1095, 1099 
(9th Cir. 1998)). In justifying its citation to a NLRA case, the Walker court pointed out that 
“[t]he similarity of the language of the two statutes is a strong indication that they should be 
treated in the same manner.” Id. at 1130 n.7 (citing Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, 259 F.3d 
1112 (9th Cir. 2001)). It might also be noted that § 3617’s legislative history shows that it was 
designed to provide similar protection to that contained in the NLRA’s antiretaliation provision. 
See supra note 133. 
205 272 F.3d at 1130. The court also quoted extensively from the dictionary, noting: 
To “coerce” is “to compel to an act or choice by force, threat, or other pressure.” 
And, more relevant for this case, “coercion” includes “the application of sanctions or 
force by a government [usually] accompanied by the suppression of constitutional 
liberties in order to compel dissenters to conform.” Finally, a “threat” is “an 
expression to inflict evil, injury, or other damage on another.”  
Id. at 1129 (alteration in original) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 439, 
2382 (14th ed. 1961)). Among the evidence suggesting that the defendant’s behavior rose to the 
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In contrast to Walker, a district court provided a narrow 
interpretation of “interferes with” in Sporn v. Ocean Colony 
Condominium Ass’n.206 The Sporn court awarded summary judgment 
in favor of neighbors who had allegedly “shunned” the plaintiffs in 
retaliation for the latter’s complaining about their condominium’s fair 
housing violations.207 According to the court, such behavior was 
simply not egregious enough to come within the concept of 
interference under § 3617.208 Sporn based this conclusion in part on 
its determination that prior § 3617 cases had involved more severe 
treatment of the plaintiffs than “shunning” (Walker was not 
mentioned)209 and on its own view that such serious behavior was the 
only legitimate concern of § 3617.210 
In holding that “shunning”-type actions “do not constitute 
‘coercion, intimidation, threats or interference’ within the meaning of 
§ 3617,”211 Sporn interpreted “interferes with” to reflect the severity 
of the other three triggering verbs used in § 3617. This interpretive 
                                                                                                                  
 
level of coercion or a threat, the Ninth Circuit cited the following:  
The City suggested it would not renew the contract if the FHF did not apologize 
when Ebner [the City’s Director of Community Development] sent a letter stating 
that “[t]he handling of The Park apartments case, and in particular the press 
conference, leaves us with serious concerns for the future. . . .” Further evidence of 
coercion is the letter from Ebner stating that payments would be withheld until the 
organization apologized. 
Id. at 1130 (second alteration and omission in original) (citing Lear Siegler Inc. v. NLRB, 890 
F.2d 1573 (10th Cir. 1989)). However, Walker held that the defendant’s action could not be 
considered “intimidation,” because this would “require a showing that the City’s activities had 
generated fear in the FHF. There has been no such showing.” Id. at 1129 n.4 (citation omitted). 
206 173 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.N.J. 2001). 
207 Id. at 251. For more on the Sporn case, see supra note 99. 
208 Id. at 251–52. 
209 Id. at 252. 
210 According to the Sporn court: 
The Fair Housing Act is remedial legislation designed to address the very important 
goal of providing accessibility to housing without regard to race, color, religion, sex, 
familial status, national origin or disability. Consistent with this goal, the 
prohibitions of § 3617 operate to ensure that situations that need to [be] remedied 
can be brought to the attention of those with the power to effectuate the necessary 
changes. Section 3617 does not, however, purport to impose a code of civility on 
those dealing with individuals who have exercised their FHA rights. Simply put, 
§ 3617 does not require that neighbors smile, say hello or hold the door for each 
other. To hold otherwise would be to extend § 3617 to conduct it was never intended 
to address and would have the effect of demeaning the aims of the Act and the 
legitimate claims of plaintiffs who have been subjected to invidious and hurtful 
discrimination and retaliation in the housing market. 
Id. at 251–52 (citation omitted). 
211 Id. at 251. 
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technique is embodied in the canon noscitur a sociis (“a word is 
known by the company it keeps”), which has been endorsed on 
occasion by the Supreme Court,212 and has been used by at least two 
other district courts to ascribe a narrow meaning to § 3617’s 
“interferes with.”213 Other district courts have agreed that § 3617 
                                                                                                                  
212 See, e.g., Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486–87 (2006) (“‘[A] word is 
known by the company it keeps’—a rule that ‘is often wisely applied to avoid the giving of 
unintended breadth to the Act of Congress.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. 
Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961))); Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U.S. 250, 255 (2000) 
(“[W]ords . . . are known by their companions.” (citing Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 
575 (1995); Jarecki, 367 U.S. at 307)); see also S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 
U.S. 370, 378 (2006) (“That several items in a list share an attribute counsels in favor of 
interpreting the other items as possessing that attribute as well.” (quoting Beecham v. United 
States, 511 U.S. 368, 371 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Dole v. United 
Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 36 (1990) (“[W]ords grouped in a list should be given related 
meaning.” (quoting Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 114–15 (1989)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). But see United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1588 (2010) (declining to 
follow this canon where the phrase at issue “contains little ambiguity”); Ali v. Fed. Bureau of 
Prisons, 128 S. Ct. 831, 840 (2008) (declining to follow this canon because “the overall 
statutory context” suggests a different meaning). 
213 In one, Housing Investors, Inc. v. City of Clanton, Ala., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (M.D. Ala. 
1999), the court rejected a § 3617 claim based on the defendants’ opposition to the plaintiffs’ 
proposal for an affordable housing development, and commented: 
The words coerce, intimidate, and threaten are clearly words that suggest force, 
violence, undue pressure, abuse of power, and measures intended to induce fear. The 
conjunction or does imply that the final word, interfere, need not equate exactly with 
the preceding words, but the context established by all of these words strung together 
is that impermissible interference must be more than peaceable opposition through 
legal channels. 
Id. at 1301. However, in a later part of this opinion, the court was willing to assume, albeit in 
dicta, that “one [bigoted] comment could constitute a § 3617 violation.” Id. 
The second was Gourlay v. Forest Lake Estates Civic Ass’n, 276 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (M.D. 
Fla. 2003), vacated pursuant to settlement, 2003 WL 22149660 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2003). In 
Gourley, the § 3617 claim was based on a homeowners’ association’s use of litigation and other 
“interferences” techniques to prevent the plaintiff-couple from having foster children in their 
home. Id. at 1225–27. The court determined that this claim hinged on the meaning of “interferes 
with” in § 3617, because the other three verbs in this provision require “either violent conduct or 
threatening conduct.” Id. at 1235. Although conceding that interference “could conceivably 
extend broadly to any conduct that limits a protected persons [sic] use or enjoyment of a 
dwelling,” id., the Gourley opinion held: 
Under the canons of statutory construction, however, the general word interfere 
should be interpreted in reference to and in context with the first three words of this 
provision. This Court concludes that the use of the phrase “interference” in Section 
3617 extends only to discriminatory conduct that is so severe or pervasive that it will 
have the effect of causing a protected person to abandon the exercise of his or her 
housing rights. 
Id. Although this decision was ultimately vacated pursuant to a settlement, Gourlay’s tough 
standard for interference claims under § 3617 was later endorsed by another district court in 
Florida. See Lawrence v. Courtyards at Deerwood Ass’n, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1145 (S.D. 
Fla. 2004) (declining to hold homeowners’ association liable under § 3617 for its failure to stop 
neighbor’s harassment of black plaintiffs based on the court’s conclusion that “to constitute 
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should be limited to severe behavior,214 with some concluding that the 
same “severe or pervasive” standard that governs harassment claims 
under § 3604(b) and Title VII is the proper measure of an interference 
claim under § 3617.215 
This goes too far. Whatever the proper standard for a § 3604(b) 
“terms and conditions” harassment claim, the language and purpose 
of that provision are distinctly different from those of § 3617. In an 
analogous situation involving Title VII, the Supreme Court in 2006 
held in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White216 that 
                                                                                                                  
 
actionable interference, in the absence of a violation of sections 3603–3606, the discriminatory 
conduct must be pervasive and severe enough to be considered as threatening or violent” (citing 
Gourlay, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 1236)). 
214 See, e.g., Whitfield v. Pub. Hous. Agency, No. Civ.03-6096 PAM/RLE, 2004 WL 
1212082, at *4–5 (D. Minn. May 19, 2004) (holding that the defendant’s negotiating demand 
that the plaintiff give up some of her rights could have been refused and therefore “[t]here is no 
allegation of undue coercion or intimidation that would rise to the level of a [§ 3617] 
violation”); Egan v. Schmock, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1092–93 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (described supra 
notes 100–03 and accompanying text); Salisbury House, Inc. v. McDermott, No. CIV.A 96-CV-
6486, 1998 WL 195693, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 1998) (holding that “some type of force or 
compulsion” is required for a § 3617 violation); see also Wood v. Briarwinds Condo. Ass’n Bd. 
of Dirs., 369 Fed. App’x 1, 3 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of pro se plaintiff’s § 3617 
claim because his allegations—that the defendant had his van towed, assessed him fines, and 
took photographs of him—“failed to allege conduct that rises to the level of coercion or 
intimidation under the FHA”); East–Miller v. Lake Cnty. Highway Dep’t, 421 F.3d 558, 564 
(7th Cir. 2005) (questioning, but not deciding, “whether the actions here were frequent and 
severe enough to give rise to” a § 3617 claim). 
215 See, e.g., Gourlay, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 1135 (described supra note 213); see also East–
Miller, 421 F.3d at 564 (noting possible use of “severe and pervasive” standard); Groteboer v. 
Eyota Econ. Dev. Auth., 724 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1025 (D. Minn. 2010) (holding that the plaintiff 
“must show severe and pervasive harassment”); Lawrence, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 1145 (using 
“severe and pervasive” standard).  
The “severe or pervasive” standard generally governs sex-based hostile-environment 
claims both under the FHA’s § 3604(b), see cases cited supra note 113, and under Title VII’s 
prohibition of discriminatory “terms, conditions, or privileges” in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), 
see, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998) (“For any sexual 
harassment preceding the employment decision to be actionable, however, the conduct must be 
severe or pervasive.”); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) 
(labeling the “severe or pervasive” standard as “crucial” in sexual-harassment claims); Harris v. 
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (applying the “severe or pervasive” standard to Title 
VII claim); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (holding that party 
carries its burden of showing a hostile work environment by satisfying the “severe or pervasive” 
standard); see also Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115–16 (2002) (noting 
that “severe or pervasive” standard applies in race-based hostile-environment claim); cf. 
Gregory v. Dillard’s, Inc., 494 F.3d 694, 717–19 (8th Cir. 2007) (Colloton, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the “severe or pervasive” standard is used to evaluate employment-harassment cases 
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and advocating use of this standard for evaluating § 1981 
interference claims in the retail-shopping context). 
216 548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
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that statute’s antiretaliation provision should be interpreted differently 
from its key substantive provision.217 The Burlington Court noted: 
The language of the substantive provision differs from that of 
the antiretaliation provision in important ways. . . .  
. . . [T]he question is whether Congress intended its 
different words to make a legal difference. We normally 
presume that, where words differ as they differ here, 
“Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate 
inclusion or exclusion.”218 
The Burlington opinion also held that Title VII’s antiretaliation 
provision served a distinct purpose from the statute’s substantive 
provision. Thus:  
[T]he two provisions differ not only in language but in 
purpose as well. The antidiscrimination provision seeks a 
workplace where individuals are not discriminated against 
because of their racial, ethnic, religious, or gender-based 
status. The antiretaliation provision seeks to secure that 
primary objective by preventing an employer from interfering 
(through retaliation) with an employee’s efforts to secure or 
advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees. The 
substantive provision seeks to prevent injury to individuals 
based on who they are, i.e., their status. The antiretaliation 
provision seeks to prevent harm to individuals based on what 
they do, i.e., their conduct.  
. . . [D]ifferences in the purpose of the two provisions . . . 
justify this difference in interpretation.219 
These differentiating factors are even more dramatic in the FHA. 
The language of § 3617, unlike that of § 3604(b), does not even use 
the term “discriminate” (as Title VII’s antiretaliation provision 
                                                                                                                  
217 Id. at 57 (holding that Title VII’s antiretaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), is 
not confined to “actions and harms . . . that are related to employment or occur at the 
workplace,” i.e., those that only affect “the terms and conditions of employment”); see also 
CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1960–61 (2008) (affirming that Burlington 
held that “Title VII’s antiretaliation provision . . . had a broader reach than the statute’s 
substantive provision”). 
218 548 U.S. at 61–63 (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)). 
219 Id. at 63, 67 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800–01 (1973)). 
“Thus, purpose reinforces what language already indicates, namely, that the antiretaliation 
provision, unlike the substantive provision, is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect 
the terms and conditions of employment.” Id. at 64 (citing Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 
546 U.S. 303, 319 (2006)). 
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does),220 and § 3617’s purposes go well beyond merely outlawing 
retaliation for participating in FHA proceedings.221 Furthermore, the 
distinction between § 3617 and § 3604(b) is also supported by the 
HUD regulation that interprets § 3617 to outlaw interfering with 
persons in the “enjoyment” of their home,222 a much broader concept 
than HUD’s interpretation of harassing behavior that runs afoul of 
§ 3604(b).223 
Thus, it seems clear that district court decisions limiting § 3617 
interference claims to behavior that is “severe or pervasive” enough 
to violate a resident’s rights under § 3604(b)224 are too restrictive. 
And the same is true for those decisions that would restrict neighbor 
harassment claims to conduct that is “designed to drive the individual 
out of his or her home.”225 Section 3617 may well cover these 
situations, but it goes farther. 
One limit on how much farther is suggested by the second part of 
the Supreme Court’s opinion in the Burlington case, which held that 
Title VII’s antiretaliation provision covers “those (and only those) 
employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a 
reasonable employee or job applicant.”226 Thus, according to the 
Burlington opinion, this provision in Title VII “protects an individual 
                                                                                                                  
220 Compare supra text accompanying note 34 (quoting § 3604(b)), with supra text 
accompanying note 29 (quoting § 3617). Title VII’s antiretaliation provision “prohibits an 
employer from ‘discriminat[ing] against’ an employee or job applicant because that individual 
‘opposed any practice’ made unlawful by Title VII or ‘made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in’ a Title VII proceeding or investigation.” Burlington, 548 U.S. at 56 (alteration in 
original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). 
221 See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 176, 182–85 and accompanying text. 
Two civil rights statutes passed in the 1990s use language in their antiretaliation 
provisions that is more similar to § 3617 than to Title VII. See Family Medical Leave Act of 
1993 § 105, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (2006) (“It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere 
with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this 
subchapter.”); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 503, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2006) 
(providing an antiharassment provision that is virtually identical in its operative language to 
§ 3617). Both of these provisions have produced substantial litigation, but rarely have the cases 
provided any useful insight into the meaning of the terms (e.g., “interfere”) that are used in 
§ 3617 but not Title VII. See, e.g., Wray v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp, 10 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 
1040 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (noting in dicta in ADA case that the defendant’s actions may have been 
“unpleasant and intimidating” and therefore sufficiently negative to come within the operative 
verbs in § 12203(b)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.400–.404 (2010) (providing regulations for 
enforcement of the Family Medical Leave Act that do not define “interfere” for purposes of 
§ 2615(a)(1)). 
222 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2) (2010). 
223 See id. §§ 100.65, 100.70(b) (describing and providing examples of conduct that 
violates § 3604(b)). 
224 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 215. 
225 Egan v. Schmock, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
226 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006). 
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not from all retaliation, but from retaliation that produces an injury or 
harm.”227 Furthermore: 
We speak of material adversity because we believe it is 
important to separate significant from trivial harms. Title VII, 
we have said, does not set forth “a general civility code for 
the American workplace.” An employee’s decision to report 
discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that employee from 
those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place 
at work and that all employees experience. The antiretaliation 
provision seeks to prevent employer interference with 
“unfettered access” to Title VII’s remedial mechanisms. It 
does so by prohibiting employer actions that are likely “to 
deter victims of discrimination from complaining to the 
EEOC,” the courts, and their employers. And normally petty 
slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners 
will not create such deterrence.228 
The Court in Burlington emphasized that the “standard for judging 
harm must be objective,” i.e., how “a reasonable employee” would 
react to the defendant’s behavior.229 Finally, Burlington determined 
that “the significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend 
upon the particular circumstances. Context matters. . . . [A]n ‘act that 
would be immaterial in some situations is material in others.’”230 
The basic standards set forth in Burlington should control future 
interference claims under § 3617.231 Burlington regularly uses 
                                                                                                                  
227 Id. at 67. 
228 Id. at 68 (citations omitted). Among the examples of nonactionable behavior that this 
passage in Burlington identified were “the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the 
sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing,” id. (quoting 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)), 
and “‘personality conflicts at work that generate antipathy’ and ‘snubbing by supervisors and 
co-workers,’” id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 1 B. LINDEMANN & P. GROSSMAN, 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 669 (3d ed. 1996)). 
229 Id. at 68. Thus, Burlington held, “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee 
would have found the challenged action materially adverse, ‘which in this context means it well 
might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 
discrimination.’” Id. (internal quotatin marks omitted) (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 
1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). According to Burlington: “An objective standard is judicially 
administrable[ and . . .] avoids the uncertainties and unfair discrepancies that can plague a 
judicial effort to determine a plaintiff’s unusual subjective feelings.” Id. at 68–69. 
230 Id. at 69 (quoting Washington v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir. 
2005)). 
231 In addition to the reasons given in the text, this proposition is supported by the courts’ 
general tendency to rely on Title VII precedents to interpret the FHA. See SCHWEMM, supra 
note 28, § 7:4 & nn.3–4 (stating that “[a] number of lower courts have followed this lead by 
relying on Title VII precedents to interpret [the FHA]” and citing numerous cases in support). 
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“interfering with” and “interference”—the key concept involved in 
most § 3617 claims—to describe the behavior being regulated.232 
Furthermore, Burlington, although recognizing that Title VII’s 
retaliation provision is distinct from its substantive provision, insisted 
that the former should reflect concerns derived from decisions 
interpreting the latter in avoiding turning the statute into “a general 
civility code.”233 The same must now presumably obtain in FHA 
cases. In summary, Burlington suggests that “interferes with” under 
§ 3617 should be interpreted to require that “a reasonable person” in 
the context of the plaintiff’s particular situation would find the 
challenged behavior so “materially adverse” that he would be deterred 
from exercising or enjoying his FHA rights.234 
Burlington’s key lesson, of course, is that § 3617 should be 
interpreted based on its own language and purpose apart from the 
FHA’s other substantive provisions. The problem, however, is that 
§ 3617, unlike its Title VII counterpart, explicitly refers to the rights 
“granted or protected” by these other substantive provisions. Thus, a 
neighbor-on-neighbor harassment case must not only involve 
behavior that would be materially adverse to a reasonable plaintiff, 
but would dissuade that person from exercising or enjoying the rights 
granted or protected by §§ 3603–3606. The next subsection examines 
what, exactly, these rights are. 
3. The Relationship of § 3617 to the Rights  
Protected by §§ 3603–3606 
The problem here is to determine whether, if a neighbor’s conduct 
is sufficiently egregious to constitute interference for purposes of 
§ 3617, that conduct affects the “exercise or enjoyment” of a “right 
granted or protected by” §§ 3603–3606. As noted above, courts have 
struggled throughout the FHA’s history to define the proper 
                                                                                                                  
232 See supra text accompanying notes 219, 228 (quoting Burlington). 
233 See supra text accompanying note 228 (quoting Burlington). 
234 See supra note 229 (quoting Burlington); cf. United States v. Hartbarger, 148 F.3d 777, 
782–83 (7th Cir. 1998) (determining, for purposes of § 3631 prosecution, that whether the 
defendants’ behavior constituted a threat involves an evaluation of the context and of how a 
reasonable person targeted by such behavior would feel); SCHWEMM, supra note 28, § 15:3 n.4, 
§ 15:6 nn.19–22, § 15:8 & n.2 (citing cases holding that, for purposes of the FHA’s prohibition 
against discriminatory ads and statements in § 3604(c), the challenged ad or statement should be 
judged by an “ordinary reader” or “ordinary listener” standard); id. § 17:2 & n.1 (citing cases 
holding that, in order to violate the FHA’s prohibition against “blockbusting” in § 3604(e), a 
challenged statement must, “under the circumstances, . . . convey to a reasonable person” the 
illegal message). 
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relationship between a § 3617 claim and the rights recognized in the 
provisions it refers to.235  
One of the few pre-Halprin appellate decisions to deal with this 
issue was produced by the Second Circuit in 1994 in Frazier v. 
Rominger.236 The Frazier opinion began its § 3617 analysis by noting 
that this provision “prohibits the interference with the exercise of Fair 
Housing rights only as enumerated in these referenced sections.”237 
The main plaintiffs in this case were a mixed-race couple who were 
rejected for an apartment after they asked the landlord (Rominger) 
whether his hesitancy about renting to them was “a racial thing.”238 
Rominger testified at trial that he decided not to rent to the couple 
because “being accused of race discrimination made him feel very 
uncomfortable, and . . . he considered it important to feel comfortable 
with his tenants.”239 The jury apparently believed this testimony and 
ruled against the plaintiffs on their refusal-to-rent claim under 
§ 3604(a),240 a ruling that was upheld on appeal.241 
The Second Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs’ § 3617 claim.242 It 
held they could not “claim that Mr. Frazier’s questioning of Mr. 
                                                                                                                  
235 See supra Part III.D.1. 
236 27 F.3d 828 (2d Cir. 1994). 
237 Id. at 834. 
238 Id. at 829–30. Besides the couple (a black man named Eddie Frazier and a white 
woman named Diane Treloar), the Frazier plaintiffs included a fair housing organization that 
had tested the case for them. Id. at 829, 831. After Rominger showed Frazier and Treloar the 
apartment, they said they would like to rent it, but Rominger told them they needed to submit an 
application and that he preferred to rent to a single tenant. Id. at 829–30. Frazier then questioned 
Rominger about his hesitancy to rent to the couple and asked Rominger, in what Rominger 
perceived as an angry tone, “Is this a racial thing?” Id. at 830. Rominger replied that it was not 
and that everyone had to fill out an application; he then provided an application form, which the 
plaintiffs completed before leaving. Id. By then, however, Rominger had apparently decided not 
to the rent to the couple because of “being accused of race discrimination.” Id. at 831. 
Thereafter, Rominger rented the apartment to a white couple for a brief period and then to a 
single Hispanic woman. Id. 
239 Id. at 831. 
240 Id. 
241 On the § 3604(a) claim, the Second Circuit held that, although the plaintiffs had 
established a prima facie case of race discrimination, the defendant’s 
proffered justification for denying the couple the apartment—Mr. Frazier’s question 
as to whether the perceived hesitancy was “a racial thing” and the discomfort this 
question engendered on Mr. Rominger’s part—was . . . a legally acceptable 
explanation for denying Mr. Frazier and Ms. Treloar the apartment which the jury 
was free to accept or reject. 
Id. at 831–32. 
242 Id. at 833–34. The plaintiffs had not originally pled a § 3617 claim, but at trial they 
moved to have the jury instructed on § 3617 as well as § 3604(a), which the trial court refused 
to do. Id. at 831. In their appeal, the plaintiffs challenged both their § 3604(a) loss and their 
inability to proceed under § 3617. Id. at 831, 833. 
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Rominger’s potential bias constituted the ‘exercise or enjoyment of’ 
one of his rights under the Fair Housing Act.”243 In other words, 
Frazier held that a minority homeseeker’s “right” to question a 
housing provider’s motivation as racial is not a “right granted or 
protected” by §§ 3603–3606. Those sections, according to the Second 
Circuit, “provide that prospective tenants have a right not to be 
discriminated against on account of their race in a wide variety of 
housing transactions.”244 However, “[n]owhere in these sections . . . 
can be found a right to question the potential racial motivations of 
landlords.”245 Thus, Frazier concluded, the plaintiffs’ § 3617 claim 
failed because it was “without a predicate.”246 
The Frazier court saw an additional problem with the plaintiffs’ 
§ 3617 claim, based on the fact that “the only ‘interference’ that 
plaintiffs can claim is the actual denial of rental housing,” which they 
alleged violated § 3604(a).247 The Second Circuit concluded that a 
§ 3617 “interference” claim could not be based solely on the same 
conduct that was concurrently being challenged under § 3604(a), 
believing that Congress never intended “such a statutory overlap” and 
thus “that the plaintiffs’ sole remedy in this case existed in their 
§ 3604(a) cause of action.”248 Based on this analysis, Frazier held that 
                                                                                                                  
243 Id. at 833. 
244 Id. at 834. 
245 Id. 
246 Id.  
247 Id. Thus, as the Second Circuit saw it, the theory underlying the plaintiffs’ § 3617 claim 
was that the defendants’ refusal to rent to them “is at the same time a § 3604(a) discrimination 
and a § 3617 interference, thus giving rise to two separate causes of action.” Id. at 833. The 
Frazier opinion described this theory as “somewhat peculiar,” id., because “under this theory, 
every allegedly discriminatory denial of housing under § 3604(a) would also constitute a 
violation of § 3617 in that the denial ‘interfered’ with the prospective tenant’s Fair Housing Act 
rights,” id. at 834.  
248 Id. at 834. As noted above, the Seventh Circuit disagrees, having concluded in both 
Bloch and Halprin that the same conduct may well result in a § 3617 violation as well as a 
§ 3604 violation. Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 782 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc); Halprin v. 
Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 328–29 (7th Cir. 2004); 
see also Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487, 491–92 (7th Cir. 1997) (described supra note 113); 
infra note 249 (describing the Seventh Circuit’s decision in the Arlington Heights case). Other 
appellate courts agree with the Seventh Circuit on this point. See, e.g., Quigley v. Winter, 598 
F.3d 938, 946–48 (8th Cir. 2010) (described supra note 113); Samaritan Inns, Inc. v. District of 
Columbia, 114 F.3d 1227, 1231, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (considering claims of §§ 3604 and 
3617 violations); HUD ex rel. Herron v. Blackwell, 908 F.2d 864, 872 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(affirming ALJ’s finding of a violation of §§ 3604 and 3617); appellate cases cited supra note 
178; see also United States v. Collier, No. 08-0686, 2010 WL 3881381, at *9–11 (W.D. La. 
Sept. 28, 2010) (finding violations of § 3617 along with § 3604(a)–(c) at urging of the Justice 
Department). Indeed, as the Bloch opinion pointed out, there is nothing unusual in concluding 
that particular conduct may violate more than one FHA provision. See Bloch, 597 F.3d at 782; 
see also SCHWEMM, supra note 28, § 11C:2 n.36, § 13:15 n.4, § 14:2 n.18, § 14:3 & n.30 (citing 
cases holding that same conduct violates multiple sections of the FHA). See generally CBOCS 
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“the plaintiffs did not state a cause of action under § 3617 separate 
and distinct from their cause of action under § 3604(a).”249 
This part of the Frazier analysis also implies, however, that a 
§ 3617 interference claim may well be viable without a violation of 
§§ 3603–3606 in a different type of case. If, as Frazier contends, no 
such § 3617 claim is available when the conduct complained of is 
unsuccessfully challenged under § 3604(a),250 the reverse corollary is 
that § 3617 may apply in situations where the complained of conduct 
does not violate §§ 3603–3606.251  
Thus, as one district court within the Second Circuit later noted in 
a neighbor-on-neighbor harassment case, Frazier certainly does not 
bar this type of § 3617 claim.252 Indeed, as we have seen, in most 
cases involving neighbor harassment, the plaintiff would not have a 
claim under §§ 3603–3606 to begin with.253 
But the question remains what § 3617 means when it refers to 
exercising or enjoying “any right granted or protected by” §§ 3603–
                                                                                                                  
 
W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2008) (describing how civil rights statutes should 
be interpreted to overlap where “the ‘overlap’ reflects congressional design”). 
In light of this overwhelming authority to the contrary, the Second Circuit’s statement 
quoted in the text must be considered misguided dicta. It is true that many courts, including the 
Seventh Circuit, have rejected a § 3617 claim after ruling against the plaintiff’s § 3604 claim 
based on the same conduct with only a brief analysis of the § 3617 claim. See supra note 178 
and accompanying text (citing cases). The Frazier court could have followed this technique. 
The fact that it chose to articulate a different approach was unfortunate, but only to the extent 
that the statement quoted in the text might be mistaken as correct. 
249 27 F.3d at 834. Frazier’s conclusion here that the same conduct cannot produce a 
§ 3617 interference claim separate from a claim under § 3604(a) is somewhat reminiscent of the 
Seventh Circuit’s determination in 1977 that, when the same conduct is alleged to have violated 
both § 3604(a) and § 3617, “the validity of the section 3617 claim depends on whether [that 
conduct] violated section 3604(a).” Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 
F.2d 1283, 1288 n.5 (7th Cir. 1977) (cited supra notes 177 and 179). In these circumstances, the 
Seventh Circuit would apparently hold that a violation of § 3604(a) means that § 3617 is also 
violated, whereas Frazier held that no § 3617 claim can be asserted in such a situation, but the 
practical result is the same: that is, the § 3617 claim provides no additional value for potential 
plaintiffs. This is at least true for cases in the modern era after the 1988 FHAA made § 3617 
claims subject to the same statutes of limitations and other enforcement procedures that govern 
§ 3604 claims. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the FHAA); supra note 
182 (citing pre-FHAA cases dealing with enforcement of § 3617). 
250 But see supra notes 248–49 and accompanying text. 
251 This view is consistent with the many decisions, both before and after Frazier, holding 
that § 3617 can, in some circumstances, produce a viable claim without a violation of §§ 3603–
3606. See cases cited supra notes 180 and 191. 
252 See Ohana v. 180 Prospect Place Realty Corp., 996 F. Supp. 238, 241 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) 
(concluding, with respect to the proposition that § 3617 can “serve as a separate basis for an 
FHA claim where there is no predicate for liability under [§§ 3603–3606],” that “a careful 
reading of Frazier suggests that the Second Circuit agrees”). For further discussion of Ohana, 
see supra note 98; infra notes 260–66 and accompanying text. 
253 See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
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3606; that is, what are the “predicate” rights under these provisions 
that Frazier held are required for a § 3617 claim. On this point, 
Frazier tells us only what such rights do not include (i.e., they do not 
include questioning a landlord about his potential bias).254 
Prior cases do suggest some affirmative answers. One example is 
Judge Posner’s hypothetical in Halprin of a neighbor burning down a 
minority’s house, which Bloch later agreed would constitute a 
violation of both §§ 3604(a) and 3617.255 Furthermore, even if the 
harassment is not so egregious as to constitute a § 3604 violation, the 
victim may still have a § 3617 claim, for, as Bloch pointed out, the 
fact that “§ 3604 prohibits discriminatory evictions[ means] that 
attempted discriminatory evictions can violate § 3617’s prohibition 
against interference with § 3604 rights.”256 
Beyond avoiding arson and attempted eviction, what other “rights” 
do minority residents have under § 3617? In addressing this question, 
it is worth remembering that § 3617 refers to rights that are “granted 
or protected” by §§ 3603–3606,257 and that the addition of the “or 
protected” phrase was one of the few changes made to § 3617’s 
substantive language during the FHA’s legislative history.258 
Furthermore, some courts have focused on the fact that the language 
of § 3617 protects not only the “exercise” but also the “enjoyment” of 
§§ 3603–3606 rights.259 For example, in Ohana v. 180 Prospect Place 
Realty Corp.,260 the court upheld the plaintiffs’§ 3617 claim based on 
neighbor harassment, concluding that the plaintiffs, “having already 
exercised their rights to fair housing” by moving into their home, had 
“a cognizable claim under § 3617” to avoid interference with “the 
enjoyment of these rights because of [their] race, religion and national 
                                                                                                                  
254 See supra notes 243–46 and accompanying text. For another example of an appellate 
court’s determination of what §§ 3603–3606 rights do not include for purposes of § 3617, see 
Dixon v. Hallmark Cos., 627 F.3d 849, 858 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that, because the plaintiffs 
have no right under § 3604(b) “to hang religious artwork in Hallmark’s rental office, which is 
separate from their personal dwelling,” their § 3617 “claim for retaliatory housing 
discrimination” cannot be based on § 3604(b) and therefore “must fail”).  
255 See Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 329 
(7th Cir. 2004) (posing hypothetical); Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 776–77, 781–82 (7th 
Cir. 2009) (en banc) (agreeing with Halprin that “§ 3604(a) may reach post-acquisition 
discriminatory conduct that makes a dwelling unavailable to the owner or tenant,” and implying 
that a physical deprivation of one’s dwelling violating § 3604(a) also violates § 3617); see also 
Bloch, 587 F.3d at 783 (holding that the plaintiffs there had a § 3617 claim if they were 
interfered with in “the . . . exercise or enjoyment of their right to inhabit their condo”). 
256 Bloch, 587 F.3d at 782. 
257 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2006) (emphasis added). 
258 See supra notes 120, 123 (summarizing the substantive changes made to § 3617). 
259 42 U.S.C. § 3617. 
260 996 F. Supp. 238 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). 
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origin.”261 In addition, a number of sex harassment cases have upheld 
§ 3617 claims based on the determination that the defendant’s 
behavior interfered with the complainant’s enjoyment of her home.262 
In upholding these interference-with-enjoyment claims, Ohana and 
some other opinions relied on—and gave Chevron deference to—
                                                                                                                  
261 Id. at 243; see also Antonio v. Sec. Servs. of Am., LLC, 701 F. Supp. 2d 749, 772 (D. 
Md. 2010) (citing § 3617 in support of the conclusion that the Fair Housing Act guarantees 
“persons basic rights to be free from discrimination in connection with their enjoyment of 
property”); United States v. Pospisil, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1064 (W.D. Mo. 2000) (“Several 
cases have affirmed the existence of a cause of action under § 3617, for discriminatory 
interference with enjoyment of occupancy . . . .”); Schroeder v. De Bertolo, 879 F. Supp. 173, 
177–78 (D.P.R. 1995) (noting, in the course of upholding various FHA claims, that the plaintiff-
resident had “the continuing right to quiet enjoyment and use of her condominium unit and 
common areas of the building” and that § 3617 bars interference with an “individual’s free 
exercise of [such] housing rights”); HUD v. Courthouse Square Co., Fair Housing–Fair Lending 
Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,155, at 26,247 (HUD ALJ 2001), available at 2001 WL 953792 
(holding, for purposes of § 3617, that it follows from the fact that an individual has “exercised 
her rights under the [FHA] by taking up residence in” respondents’ housing that “her continued 
enjoyment of her tenancy would be deemed an exercise of her rights under the [FHA]”); HUD 
v. Gutleben, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,078, at 25,726–27 (HUD 
ALJ 1994), available at 1994 WL 441981 (holding that respondent-neighbor’s racial slurs 
directed at black family violated § 3617 because they “interfered with Complainants’ exercise of 
that right, i.e., a quiet enjoyment of their apartment, because of Complainants’ race” and 
“interfered with their ability to reside there free from such menace. . . . [and the] right to enjoy 
[their] home free from such slurs”), modified, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & 
Bus.) ¶ 25,103 (HUD ALJ 1994). 
262 E.g., Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 947–48 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that landlord’s 
“numerous unwanted interactions of a sexual nature . . . interfered with [the plaintiff’s] use and 
enjoyment of her home” and violated § 3617 because they interfered with the plaintiff’s 
“enjoyment of her housing rights”); United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 978–80 (D. 
Neb. 2004) (holding that § 3617 is violated by landlord’s unwelcome sexual advances to female 
tenants that interfered with their “enjoyment of a dwelling because of [their] sex”); HUD v. 
Krueger, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rptr. ¶ 25,119, at 26,026 (HUD ALJ 1996), available at 
1996 WL 418886 (holding that landlord’s sexual harassment of female tenant violated § 3617 
because it interfered with “her exercise of the right she was attempting to enjoy,” i.e., “she was 
attempting to enjoy a right protected under the Act—quiet enjoyment of her apartment without 
interference from sexual harassment”), aff’d sub nom. Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487 (7th 
Cir. 1997); HUD v. Kogut, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rptr. ¶ 25,100, at 25,904 (HUD ALJ 
1995), available at 1995 WL 225277 (holding that landlord’s eviction of tenant who refused his 
sexual advances violated § 3617 because “she was attempting to enjoy housing free from 
interference because of discrimination; that is, she was exercising her right to quiet enjoyment 
of her apartment”). In the Koch case, the court opined: 
[I]f a woman rents an apartment-ostensibly pursuant to the same lease terms that are 
provided to all other tenants-it seems to me that she has exercised her rights to obtain 
a dwelling without discrimination on account of her sex. This right is protected by 
section 3604, although there has been no violation of this right. If, however, after she 
has taken possession of the property, she is then subjected to discriminatory acts 
based upon her sex, it seems to me that she should be allowed to prove that she 
experienced [a § 3617 violation through] interference-if not threats, intimidation, or 
coercion-on account of her having exercised or enjoyed her right of access to 
housing protected by section 3604. 
352 F. Supp. 2d at 978–79 n.8. 
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HUD’s § 3617 regulation,263 which outlaws “interfering with persons 
in their enjoyment of a dwelling” because of such persons’ race or 
other factor prohibited by the FHA.264 The Ohana opinion, in 
particular, emphasized that this made it appropriate to interpret 
§ 3617 to cover “actions that would interfere with the enjoyment of a 
person’s property” or that interfere with the “peaceful enjoyment of 
one’s home.”265 The latter concept, according to Ohana, 
is obviously sufficiently pervasive to embrace the expectation 
that one should be able to live in racial and ethnic harmony 
with one’s neighbors. This case is not about providing a 
federal judicial forum for the resolution of disputes amongst 
neighbors. It is simply about holding one accountable for 
intentionally intruding upon the quietude of another’s home 
because of that person’s race, color, religion, sex, familial 
status or national origin. The Fair Housing Act . . . is an 
appropriate means for accomplishing this salutary end . . . .266 
Thus, the conclusion suggested by Ohana and the HUD 
regulations is that § 3617 may be invoked in any case where the 
challenged conduct interferes with the plaintiff’s “right” to enjoy his 
or her home free from invidiously motivated harassment, i.e., that 
such a right is “granted or protected by” §§ 3603–3606.267 This would 
                                                                                                                  
263 E.g., Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 979–80; Ohana, 996 F. Supp. at 242. For more on the 
meaning of Chevron deference, see supra notes 152–54 and accompanying text. 
In Bloch, the Seventh Circuit gave HUD’s interpretation in this regulation “great weight,” 
Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 782 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Trafficante v. Metro. 
Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972)), but not full Chevron deference, id. (citing Adams 
Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649–50 (1990)). In Adams Fruit, the Supreme Court refused 
to defer to a Department of Labor regulation, holding that a precondition for Chevron deference, 
i.e., that the statute contain a delegation of administrative authority to the agency, did not exist 
here, because the Department of Labor was given authority only to promulgate substantive 
standards and not also to define the extent of private rights of action, which remained the 
province of the judiciary. 494 U.S. at 649–50. Unlike Adams Fruit, however, the issue here is 
how the FHA’s substantive provisions should be interpreted. As to this, the FHA does delegate 
administrative authority to HUD. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (describing the FHA 
grant of authority to HUD); see also Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 287–88 (2003) (citing 
Chevron in support of deferring to a HUD regulation interpreting the FHA). Thus, Bloch should 
have given full Chevron deference to HUD’s § 3617 regulation, as Ohana and other courts have 
done.  
264 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2) (2010). 
265 996 F. Supp. at 241, 243. 
266 Id. at 243 (citing United States v. Weisz, 914 F. Supp. 1050, 1054–55 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996)). 
267 For a further description of these provisions, see supra notes 31–33 and accompanying 
text. In neighbor harassment cases, it would seem particularly appropriate to attribute this right 
as being protected by § 3604(b), which outlaws discrimination in the privileges, terms, and 
conditions of the sale or rental of a dwelling.  
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mean, as least in theory, that any race-based abusive remark by a 
neighbor might suffice to trigger a § 3617 claim. If, as suggested in 
the previous Section, however, the Title VII standards from 
Burlington apply, then the neighbor’s behavior would have to be 
sufficiently egregious that a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s 
position would consider the behavior to have a materially adverse 
effect on the enjoyment of one’s home.268 But this is a far more 
generous standard than that advocated in some earlier neighbor 
harassment cases (e.g., that such harassment would be actionable only 
if it were designed to oust the plaintiffs from their home).269 And it is 
a significantly different standard than Bloch’s “pattern of harassment” 
requirement.270 Instead, the key would be how a reasonable minority 
homeowner or tenant would respond to the defendant’s behavior; thus 
liability could result, in a given context and contrary to Bloch, from 
an “isolated act of discrimination.”271 
The incident(s) must, however, be “invidiously motivated.” The 
right being recognized for purposes of § 3617 is not peaceful 
enjoyment generally, but a particular kind of peaceful enjoyment, i.e., 
that undisturbed by racial or other FHA-condemned types of 
harassment. Thus, Bloch and other courts have been correct in 
identifying the necessary elements for such a § 3617 claim as 
including the defendant’s being “motivated by an intent to 
discriminate,”272 even though this element is not required in certain 
other types of § 3617 claims.273 This means, for example, that the 
Weisz court’s rejection of a neighbor harassment claim was sound, at 
least to the extent the court there accurately attributed the defendant’s 
                                                                                                                  
268 See supra notes 226–30 and accompanying text (discussing the Burlington “materially 
adverse to a reasonable employee” standard). 
269 See supra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing Egan v. Schmock). 
270 Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 783 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Halprin v. 
Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 2004)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
271 Id. (quoting Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
272 Id. (citing East–Miller v. Lake Cnty. Highway Dep’t, 421 F.2d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 
2005)); see also Simoes v. Wintermere Pointe Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., No. 6:08-CV-01384-
LSC, 2009 WL 2216781, at *6 (M.D. Fla. July 22, 2009) (awarding summary judgment against 
Brazilian resident’s § 3617 claim on the ground that he failed to show that the defendant’s 
actions were prompted by “Latin American animus” or “animus toward Brazilians”), aff’d, 375 
Fed. App’x 927 (11th Cir. 2010). 
273 For example, in retaliation claims under § 3617, the required elements are that: (1) the 
plaintiff was engaged in an activity protected by §§ 3603–3606; (2) the defendant took some 
adverse action against the plaintiff; and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected 
activity and the adverse action. See SCHWEMM, supra note 28, § 20:5, at 20-27 n.3 (citing 
cases). But see Campbell v. Robb, 162 Fed. App’x 460, 472–74 (6th Cir. 2006) (requiring, 
based on prior circuit precedent, a showing of discriminatory animus in § 3617 retaliation 
claim). 
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behavior solely to hostility to her neighbors that was not based on 
their religion.274 
Given the FHA’s goal of fostering integration,275 it seems obvious 
that § 3617 should cover invidiously motivated harassment that 
discourages minorities from moving into white areas276 or, once there, 
makes them feel so unwelcome that they decide to move away.277 But 
§ 3617 goes beyond those situations where a change of residence 
occurs.278 Interference under § 3617 should be interpreted to include 
any neighbor harassment that would reduce a reasonable person’s 
enjoyment of his home sufficiently to raise the prospect of having to 
move. 
                                                                                                                  
274 See supra notes 104–09 and accompanying text (summarizing the Weisz holding and 
rationale). 
275 See supra notes 144–48 and accompanying text. 
276 See, e.g., HUD v. Weber, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,041, 
at 25,424 (HUD ALJ 1993), available at 1993 WL 246392 (noting that minority who was 
inspecting a rental unit when local resident verbally harassed him did not rent this unit, but is 
protected by § 3617 because he had “a right to attempt to rent a home without being subjected to 
discrimination”); cf. United States v. Craft, 484 F.3d 922, 926 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that 
convictions under § 3631 may be based on behavior directed at minorities before they 
“physically reside in the property” (citing United States v. White, 788 F.2d 390, 392 (6th Cir. 
1986); United States v. Anzalone, 555 F.2d 317, 318 (2d Cir. 1977))). 
277 See, e.g., HUD v. Lashley, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) 
¶ 25,039, at 25,405 (HUD ALJ 1992), available at 1992 WL 406539 (noting that victims moved 
as a result of neighbor harassment that was held to violate § 3617); HUD v. Johnson, Fair 
Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,076, at 25,705 (HUD ALJ 1994), available 
at 1994 WL 391135 (same). 
278 See Fowler v. Borough of Westville, 97 F. Supp. 2d 602, 610–611, 613–14 (D.N.J. 
2000) (upholding § 3617 claim where the defendants’ alleged harassment was unsuccessful in 
driving the plaintiffs from their home); Schroeder v. De Bertolo, 879 F. Supp. 173, 178 (D.P.R. 
1995) (same); supra notes 63, 259–68 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ understanding 
that the reach of § 3617 extends beyond circumstances in which physical vacation of the 
property results); cf. United States v. Vartanian, 245 F.3d 609, 612 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting, in 
upholding the defendant’s § 3631 conviction for making racist threats regarding a black family 
about to move into the defendant’s neighborhood, that the family “nevertheless decided to go 
through with the purchase of the home, but they kept strict watch over their children so as to 
protect them from possible attacks or mischief from their neighbors”); United States v. 
Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241, 1252–53 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that § 3631 conviction does not 
require that the target of the defendant’s behavior leave their home); United States v. Wood, 780 
F.2d 955, 961 (11th Cir. 1986) (same). In the Wood case, the Eleventh Circuit wrote, in the 
course of upholding a § 3631 conviction: 
Section 3631 was clearly designed to protect an individual’s right to occupy a 
dwelling of one’s choice free from racial pressure. . . . The statute prohibits acts of 
willful intimidation of or interference with a victim “because of his race . . . and 
because he is . . . occupying . . . any dwelling.” Section 3631 nowhere mentions that 
the acts be designed to force an individual to move; it merely requires that the acts be 
precipitated by the individual’s occupation of a particular house. “Occupation” 
includes more than mere physical presence within four walls; the term clearly 
incorporates the right to associate in one’s home with members of another race. 
Id. (second, third, and fourth omissions in original). 
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While predicting how a reasonable person would react to a 
particular incident or type of housing harassment may be difficult,279 
it seems likely that most Americans would find a challenge to their 
right to live in their chosen home an extremely stressful situation.280  
Furthermore, because many of these cases involve minority 
families who have recently moved into predominantly white areas, it 
would be reasonable for them to be somewhat on their guard and to 
react negatively to race-based abuse that interferes with the peaceful 
enjoyment of their home.281 
In summary, the conclusion seems inescapable that even one 
invidiously motivated incident or abusive remark by a hostile 
neighbor might well result in liability under § 3617. This was, in fact, 
the holding in an early HUD administrative decision rendered shortly 
after the 1988 FHAA reenacted § 3617,282 and it is a conclusion that 
                                                                                                                  
279 But certainly not outside the range of judicial competence. See supra note 229 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Burlington court’s use of a reasonable-person analysis in the 
employment-discrimination context); see also Short, supra note 47, at 211 n.53 (arguing that the 
“concern over potentially federalizing common, ordinary neighbor-to-neighbor disputes . . . 
ignores the ability of judges to draw appropriate lines in hard cases”). 
280 See, e.g., Regina Cohen, Comment, Home Is No Haven: An Analysis of Sexual 
Harassment in Housing, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 1061, 1073–74 (1987) (describing typical reactions 
of housing-harassment victims to include feelings of nervousness, frustration, fear, and anger, 
which can manifest themselves in physical illness, decreased work productivity, and 
depression); Florence Wagman Roisman, The Right to Remain: Common Law Protections for 
Security of Tenure: An Essay in Honor of John Otis Calmore, 86 N.C. L. REV. 817, 820–29 
(2008) (discussing the importance of security of tenure as an element of the human right to 
housing); Robert G. Schwemm & Rigel C. Oliveri, A New Look at Sexual Harassment Under 
the Fair Housing Act: The Forgotten Role of § 3604(c), 2002 WIS. L. REV. 771, 786–88 (2002) 
(citing sources dealing with the negative effects of sex harassment in housing); cf. Homesavers 
Council of Greenfield Gardens, Inc. v. Sanchez, 874 N.E.2d 497, 502 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) 
(finding it foreseeable that tenant would suffer emotional distress as a result of landlord’s 
interference with her quiet enjoyment). 
281 See, e.g., HUD v. Gutleben, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) 
¶ 25,078, at 25,726–27 (HUD ALJ 1994), available at 1994 WL 441981 (describing, in holding 
that respondent-neighbor’s racial slurs violated § 3617, how various members of the target 
family were negatively affected by these comments, including the children suffering fear and 
nightmares), modified, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,103 (HUD ALJ 
1994); cf. United States v. Vartanian, 245 F.3d 609, 616 & n.2 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting, in 
upholding the defendant’s § 3631 conviction for making racist threats regarding a black family 
about to move into the defendant’s neighborhood, that the target of these threats “justifiably felt 
compelled to take special precautions to ensure the well-being of their family members,” which 
included altering their lifestyles, limiting their children’s activities, and rearranging the furniture 
“so it wasn’t in front of the window. . . . to be sure if a brick or gunshots or something that came 
into the window, it wouldn’t hit anybody,” and that the defendant “was, or should have been, 
aware that such defensive actions were but natural reactions flowing from [his threatening] 
comments”); United States v. Magleby, 241 F.3d 1306, 1314–16 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting, in 
upholding the defendant’s § 3631 conviction for burning a cross in the yard of an interracial 
family, that the family thereafter took extensive security measures that included having their 
eleven-year-old son carry and sleep with a baseball bat for protection). 
282 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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seems justified by the statute’s text, purpose, and legislative history. 
The next Section examines whether this interpretation is foreclosed 
by First Amendment considerations. 
E. First Amendment Considerations 
1. Overview 
Defendants accused of violating § 3617 based on their speech or 
other expressive activities have often argued that they are protected 
from liability by the First Amendment.283 Actually, First Amendment 
arguments have been made in two distinct types of § 3617 cases: 
(1) those where the defendants have opposed a housing project 
through litigation and/or comments to a local zoning board or similar 
governmental entity; and (2) those where the defendant-neighbors’ 
harassment has taken the form of verbal abuse or other type of 
communication directed at minority residents.284 Defendants in the 
former type of case clearly do have some First Amendment 
protection, at least so long as their litigation or petitioning behavior 
has a good-faith basis and is not solely motivated by a discriminatory 
factor condemned by the FHA.285 
                                                                                                                  
283 See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 285–87. 
284 On occasion, both situations may be present in the same case. See, e.g., Simoes v. 
Wintermere Pointe Homeowners Ass’n, No. 6:08-CV-01384-LSC, 2009 WL 2216781, at *6–8 
(M.D. Fla. July 22, 2009) (rejecting, for lack of proof of discriminatory animus, Brazilian 
resident’s § 3617 claim based on a variety of hostile actions by homeowners’ association that 
included state court litigation), aff’d, 375 Fed. App’x 927 (11th Cir. 2010); Scialabba v. Sierra 
Blanca Condo. No. One Ass’n, No. 00 C 5344, 2000 WL 1889664, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 
2000) (upholding § 3617 claim on behalf of mentally disabled condominium resident based on 
the defendants’ allegedly having “imposed discriminatory conditions upon [his] use of 
condominium facilities” and filed “a lawsuit to enforce liens imposed for discriminatory 
purposes”); Schroeder v. De Bertolo, 879 F. Supp. 173, 178 (D.P.R. 1995) (upholding § 3617 
claim by mentally disabled condominium resident who alleged that she had been the target of a 
series of intimidating actions by the condominium’s management and some of her neighbors, 
including groundless civil lawsuits, threats of criminal complaints, and unauthorized searches of 
her unit). 
285 For examples of cases that have upheld First Amendment claims in this situation, see 
White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1230–37 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Robinson, Fair 
Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 15,979 (D. Conn. 1995); HUD v. Grappone, 
Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. ¶ 25,059, at 25,574–79 (HUD ALJ 1993), available at 1993 
WL 388605; see also New W., L.P. v. City of Joliet, 491 F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(suggesting that the defendant’s First Amendment rights to speak and petition might shield it 
from FHA liability for its having filed a state court condemnation proceeding against the 
plaintiff’s apartment complex and its lobbying HUD not to renew the complex’s funding); 
Affordable Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Fresno, 433 F.3d 1182, 1193, 1197–98 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(awarding attorney’s fees to the defendants who prevailed in a suit accusing them of unlawfully 
interfering with a housing developer by opposing its proposal before the city council, after 
noting that an individual’s First Amendment right to publically oppose a proposed housing 
development had been established since the early 1990s); Hous. Investors, Inc. v. City of 
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As for neighbor harassment cases, no court has yet held that an 
otherwise unlawful communication under § 3617 is protected by the 
First Amendment.286 Some opinions, however, have recognized First 
Amendment concerns and have accordingly interpreted § 3617 
narrowly to steer clear of barring protected expression,287 an approach 
that has also been followed in other types of FHA cases.288 This 
                                                                                                                  
 
Clanton, Ala., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1301 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (described infra note 287). 
Other cases have rejected First Amendment claims in this situation. See, e.g., United States 
v. Wagner, 940 F. Supp. 972, 980–83 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (explaining that First Amendment 
protection did not apply because the defendant filed suit with an objectively baseless claim and 
with improper motive); Tizes v. Curcio, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) 
¶ 16,021, at 16,021.2–.3 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (finding that the defendants’ lawsuit against the 
plaintiffs was not protected by the First Amendment because there is no protection when one 
uses administrative or judicial proceedings for fraudulent or unlawful purposes); see also United 
States v. Scott, 788 F. Supp. 1555, 1562–63 (D. Kan. 1992) (finding § 3617 violation based on 
the defendants’ efforts to block housing for disabled persons, which included filing a lawsuit, 
without discussing First Amendment issues). See generally Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 
461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983) (holding that baseless litigation is not protected by the First 
Amendment’s right to petition). 
286 See, e.g., LeBlanc–Sternberg v. Fletcher, 781 F. Supp. 261, 265–67 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(holding that the First Amendment does not protect defendants against § 3617 claim based on 
their efforts to harass and discourage Orthodox Jews from living in the defendants’ town); HUD 
v. Simpson, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,082, at 25,761 (HUD ALJ 
1994), available at 1994 WL 497538 (holding that respondent-neighbors’ campaign of 
harassment against Hispanic family in violation of § 3617 was not protected by the First 
Amendment), petition for review dismissed without opinion, 110 F.3d 64, 1997 WL 103364 (6th 
Cir. 1997); HUD v. Gutleben, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,078, at 
25,727–28 (HUD ALJ 1994), available at 1994 WL 441981 (holding that respondent-
neighbors’ racial epithets and other remarks in violation of black tenants’ rights under § 3617 
were not protected by the First Amendment), modified, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen 
L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,103 (HUD ALJ 1994). 
287 See Gourlay v. Forest Lake Estates Civic Ass’n, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1236 
(M.D. Fla. 2003) (ruling against § 3617 claim after expressing “serious constitutional concerns” 
about a case like this “where, arguably, Plaintiffs are trying to regulate speech because of its 
emotive impact on the Plaintiffs”), vacated pursuant to settlement, No. 8:02CV1955T30TGW, 
2003 WL 22149660 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2003); Salisbury House, Inc. v. McDermott, No. 
CIV.A. 96-CV-6468, 1998 WL 195693, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 1998) (ruling against § 3617 
claim after expressing concern “about potential First Amendment conflicts which may arise 
were we to interpret ‘interfere’ [in § 3617] in its broadest sense”); cf. Hous. Investors, Inc., 68 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1301 (avoiding issue of whether the First Amendment protects § 3617 defendants 
from liability based on their opposition to an affordable-housing project in public hearings 
before local government commission by construing § 3617 not to cover such behavior). See 
generally United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994) (noting that statutes 
should be read to eliminate constitutional doubts “so long as such a reading is not plainly 
contrary to the intent of Congress” (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. 
& Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988))); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 
(1988) (recognizing “the well-established principle that statutes will be interpreted to avoid 
constitutional difficulties” (citing Erznoznik v. Cty of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975); 
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973))); United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 27 
(1980) (“[T]his Court will not pass on the constitutionality of an Act of Congress if a 
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”). 
288 See, e.g., Hous. Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 943 F.2d 
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approach also reflects the FHA’s own first section, which states: “It is 
the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional 
limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.”289 All of 
this makes clear that the basic theme of this Article—that § 3617 
should be more generously interpreted to ban most forms of neighbor-
on-neighbor harassment—must take into account First Amendment 
concerns. 
2. Cross-Burning Cases 
The Supreme Court has made clear in two cross-burning cases that 
racist expressions directed at minority homeowners may be regulated 
consistent with the First Amendment. In the first, R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, Minnesota,290 a 1992 case, the Court struck down a city 
ordinance banning certain hate-inspired symbols because it too 
broadly restricted freedom of speech,291 but noted that the defendant’s 
act of burning a cross in a black family’s yard could have been 
prosecuted under a properly drawn statute.292 Indeed, the R.A.V. 
                                                                                                                  
 
644, 650–53 (6th Cir. 1991) (rejecting FHA-based challenge to newspaper’s housing ads that 
featured only white models on the ground that the plaintiff’s theory hinged on a construction of 
the FHA that raised serious First Amendment concerns); Stewart v. Furton, 774 F.2d 706, 710 
n.2 (6th Cir. 1985) (implying in FHA case against landlord that basing liability on his biased 
statement unrelated to a specific discriminatory transaction would raise difficult First 
Amendment issues); see also United States v. Northside Realty Assocs., Inc., 474 F.2d 1164, 
1169–71 (5th Cir. 1973) (reversing liability finding because of the possibility that it may have 
rested in part on the fact that the defendant had stated his belief that the FHA was 
unconstitutional); cf. BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 529–36 (2002) (adopting a 
limited construction of the National Labor Relations Act’s anti-interference provision in part to 
avoid difficult First Amendment issues that might result from a broader interpretation). 
289 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006) (emphasis added). 
290 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
291 Id. at 391–96. 
292 See id. at 380 n.1 (listing a number of state criminal laws under which the defendant’s 
conduct could have been punished). Indeed, the R.A.V. defendant himself was later convicted of 
violating § 3631, the criminal provision that was passed as a companion to the FHA. See United 
States v. J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821, 824–28 (8th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the argument of R.A.V. and his 
coconspirators that their § 3631 convictions violated the First Amendment because § 3631 is 
“not directed toward protected speech, but [is] directed only at intentional threats, intimidation, 
and interference with federally guaranteed rights”). Other post-R.A.V. decisions also rejected 
First Amendment challenges to § 3631 prosecutions for cross burning or similar behavior. See, 
e.g., United States v. Stewart, 65 F.3d 918, 930 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that the defendants’ 
prosecution for cross burning was based on their “act and not the opinion or belief which 
motivated it” and that their intentionally threatening and intimidating action was thus “not 
protected by the First Amendment”); United States v. Gilbert, 813 F.2d 1523, 1529 (9th Cir. 
1987) (holding that threats, which constitute conduct carried out through speech, are not 
protected by the First Amendment); United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241, 1249–52 (7th Cir. 
1993) (holding that a cross burning is equivalent to fighting words, and therefore, prohibition is 
constitutional); see also United States v. Magleby, 420 F.3d 1136, 1138 (10th Cir. 2005) 
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opinion cited Title VII as an example of a constitutionally appropriate 
restriction on conduct that may have the permissible secondary effect 
of limiting expression.293 Eleven years later, in Virginia v. Black,294 
the Court again found the particular statute at issue constitutionally 
suspect, but held that “a State, consistent with the First Amendment, 
may ban cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate.”295 
Thus, constitutional concerns do not prevent laws from banning 
cross burning done with “the intent to intimidate.” This would 
presumably also be true for other kinds of threatening speech 
designed to intimidate a targeted person or group.296 As a result, 
holding that § 3617 outlaws neighbor harassment that takes the form 
of expression designed to intimidate a minority homeowner or tenant 
would not violate the First Amendment.297 
                                                                                                                  
 
(rejecting habeas petition raising First Amendment challenge to § 3631 conviction for cross 
burning at interracial couple’s home). 
293 Thus, according to R.A.V.: 
[S]exually derogatory “fighting words,” among other words, may produce a violation 
of Title VII’s general prohibition against sexual discrimination in employment 
practices. Where the government does not target conduct on the basis of its 
expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation merely because they 
express a discriminatory idea or philosophy. 
505 U.S. at 389–90 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1991)); see also 
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to 
Title VII’s prohibition of invidiously motivated employment discrimination). 
294 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
295 Id. at 347; see also id. at 363 (“A ban on cross burning carried out with the intent to 
intimidate is fully consistent with our holding in R.A.V. and is proscribable under the First 
Amendment.”). 
Two of the defendants in Black had been convicted under a Virginia criminal statute of 
attempting to burn a cross on the yard of a black neighbor, id. at 351, and the Court, though 
finding reversible error in their convictions, held that they could be retried for this act under a 
narrowed interpretation of this statute that would avoid violating the First Amendment, id. at 
367–68. 
296 See id. at 362 (noting generally that “it would be constitutional to ban only a particular 
type of threat” and quoting R.A.V. to the effect that “threats of violence are outside the First 
Amendment” (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388)). 
The text uses “presumably” only because the Court in Black was at pains to stress the 
particularly noxious history of cross burning in the United States as a “symbol of hate.” See id. 
at 353–57; see also id. at 389–91 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part) (recounting the history of cross 
burning and concluding that “[i]n our culture, cross burning has almost invariably meant 
lawlessness and understandably instills in its victims well-grounded fear of physical violence”).  
297 This statement assumes that § 3617 is directed primarily at conduct and only 
secondarily affects speech, an assumption that is supported by its textual focus on acts that 
“coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with” and by numerous decisions upholding the 
constitutionality of convictions under its companion provision, § 3631. See, e.g., J.H.H., 22 F.3d 
at 824–28 (quoted supra note 292); Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1250 (holding that § 3631 “is aimed at 
curtailing wrongful conduct . . . . [and] because [it] is content-neutral, it does not directly 
regulate speech”). 
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But what of less egregious remarks, such as “Go back where you 
belong”?298 At the very least, legitimate First Amendment concerns in 
this type of situation reinforce the notion that § 3617 claims should be 
subject to the Title VII standards adopted in Burlington, which means 
that a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would have to be 
materially affected by the defendant’s comments.299 As Burlington 
instructed, this would require an examination of the particular 
circumstances to determine whether such a person in this context 
would have the enjoyment of his or her home materially harmed.300 
Assuming a positive answer—and therefore potential § 3617 
liability—then the First Amendment would allow such liability, at 
least in those cases where the defendant’s comments were made with 
the intent of intimidating the plaintiff. The difficult case would be 
where a reasonable plaintiff felt materially harmed, but the defendant 
did not intend to intimidate. 
This is certainly possible, as a recent sex harassment case 
illustrates. In Quigley v. Winter301 the Eighth Circuit affirmed a 
landlord’s liability under the FHA for subjecting a female tenant to 
                                                                                                                  
 
Concluding that such a statute is aimed at conduct is crucial to its passing constitutional 
muster, as R.A.V. and its progeny make clear. See supra note 293 (quoting R.A.V.); Wisconsin v. 
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993) (noting the importance of this distinction in upholding a 
state statute providing for enhanced sentences for crimes motivated by race or other prohibited 
factor by observing that “whereas the ordinance struck down in R.A.V. was explicitly directed at 
expression . . . , the statute in this case is aimed at conduct unprotected by the First 
Amendment”). 
298 See, e.g., United States v. Collier, No. 08-0686, 2010 WL 3881381, at *10–11 (W.D. 
La. Sept. 28, 2010) (holding that landlord violated § 3617 by, inter alia, repeatedly making 
statements that he would not allow “those kind of people” to live at his residential community, 
which statement the court found to reflect his intent “to prevent African Americans from buying 
property or living at” this community); cf. Gomez–Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1935 (2008) 
(citing comments made to the plaintiff that she should “go back to where she belong[ed]” as one 
example of the harassment that justified her retaliation claim under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. 
May, 359 F.3d 683, 685 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting defendant convicted for violating § 3631 who 
said that his burning of a cross near a black family’s home was to “let the nigger know he 
wasn’t welcomed [sic] here” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. McInnis, 976 
F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that under § 3631, the defendant’s sign stating 
“Niggers Get Out! Go Back To Your Slums” supported jury’s finding that the defendant 
“intended to interfere with [the neighboring black family’s] occupancy of their home” (citing 
United States v. Skillman, 922 F.2d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Ky. Comm’n on Human Rights v. Foster, No. 04-CI-03103, slip op. at 1 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 
Feb. 1, 2008) (holding that state’s equivalent of § 3631 was violated by, inter alia, the 
defendants’ “yelling racial epithets such as ‘f----- niggers’ and ‘get out of town’”). 
299 See supra notes 227–29 and accompanying text (discussing Burlington). 
300 See supra notes 229–30 and accompanying text (discussing Burlington). 
301 598 F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 2010). 
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“unwanted interactions of a sexual nature” in her home,302 noting that 
this was “a place where Quigley was entitled to feel safe and secure 
and need not flee, which makes Winter’s conduct even more 
egregious.”303 Obviously, the Eighth Circuit believed that the plaintiff 
felt materially harmed by the defendant’s conduct,304 but, 
significantly for our discussion here, it never described that conduct 
as being undertaken with an intent to intimidate.305 
3. Speech Directed at People in Their Homes 
In Quigley, the defendant’s offensive behavior included instances 
of purely verbal communication, but he raised no First Amendment 
defense.306 This seems appropriate, in light of the fact that only 
limited constitutional protection exists for speech that is directed at 
people in their homes. The Supreme Court has recognized that there 
is a “significant difference between state restrictions on a speaker’s 
right to address a willing audience and those that protect listeners 
from unwanted communication,”307 and the Court has applied this 
“unwilling audience” doctrine with particular diligence in cases 
involving communicative intrusions into a listener’s home.308 The 
                                                                                                                  
302 Id. at 947. 
303 Id. Elsewhere in Quigley, the Eighth Circuit commented that the defendant’s conduct 
was especially reprehensible because it “intruded upon Quigley’s sense of security in her own 
home.” Id. at 954. 
304 As a result of the defendant’s unwelcome sexual advances, the plaintiff considered 
moving and felt “uncomfortable,” “scared,” and “worried about protecting her children and 
younger sister,” id. at 944, for which the jury awarded her $13,685 in compensatory damages on 
her FHA claims, id. at 945. This award was not challenged on appeal, but the Eighth Circuit did 
reduce the jury’s punitive award of $250,000 to $54,750. Id. at 952–56. 
305 See id. at 944–48. The Eighth Circuit described the defendant’s conduct as 
“reprehensible” and “unquestionably intentional and more than churlish,” id. at 954, but it never 
focused on or determined whether this conduct was intended to intimidate the plaintiff. 
Similar holdings occur regularly in the employment context. See, e.g., Chaney v. Plainfield 
Heathcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 912 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding in a Title VII case “that a reasonable 
person would find [the defendant’s] work environment hostile or abusive” based in part on 
coworkers’ racial epithets directed at the black plaintiff, without considering whether these 
remarks were intended to intimidate her). 
306 See Quigley, 598 F.3d at 944–48. The purely verbal examples of the defendant’s 
unwelcome interactions with the plaintiff included “sexually suggestive comments” and 
“several middle of the night phone calls to her home.” Id. at 947. There was also evidence of 
unwelcome physical interactions, e.g., “unwanted touching on two occasions.” Id. 
307 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715–16 (2000). 
308 See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 625 (1995) (recognizing 
government’s overriding “interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the 
home” and the home’s special role as a place to “avoid intrusions” and one “which the State 
may legislate to protect” (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980); Frisby v. Schultz, 
487 U.S. 474, 484–85 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cohen v. California, 403 
U.S. 15, 21–22 (1971) (“[T]his Court has recognized that government may properly act in many 
situations to prohibit intrusion into the privacy of the home of unwelcome views and ideas 
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rationale is that, while people assume the risk of being confronted 
with unwanted speech when they venture out into the world, their 
home is the one place to which they are entitled to retreat to enjoy 
privacy, repose, and peace of mind;309 as a result, the government’s 
interest in protecting people from unwelcome speech in their homes is 
“of the highest order.”310 
A leading case involving this doctrine is Frisby v. Schultz,311 
where the Court in 1988—the same year that the FHAA reenacted 
§ 3617’s substantive prohibitions312—rejected a First Amendment 
challenge to an ordinance that banned picketing targeted at an 
individual residence.313 Speaking for the Court in Frisby, Justice 
O’Connor wrote: 
                                                                                                                  
 
which cannot be totally banned from the public dialogue . . . . [In terms of one’s] claim to a 
recognizable privacy interest . . . , surely there is nothing like the interest in being free from 
unwanted expression in the confines of one’s own home.”); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 
397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) (“The ancient concept that a ‘man’s home is his castle’ into which 
‘not even the king may enter’ has lost none of it vitality, and none of the recognized exceptions 
includes any right to communicate offensively with another.” (citing Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 
U.S. 523 (1967))); infra notes 310 and 314 and accompanying texts (discussing Frisby v. 
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), and Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980)); see also Watchtower 
Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165 (2002) (noting that “the 
protection of residents’ privacy” is among the “important interests that the [government] may 
seek to safeguard through some form of regulation of solicitation activity”); Consol. Edison Co. 
v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 542 & n.11 (1980) (recognizing “the special 
privacy interests that attach to persons who seek seclusion within their own homes” (citing 
Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737)); Erznoznick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) 
(“[S]elective [speech] restrictions have been upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the 
privacy of the home . . . .” (citing Rowan, 397 U.S. 728)). 
309 See, e.g., Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484–85; supra note 308; infra notes 310 and 314 and 
accompanying text (discussing Frisby and Carey). 
310 Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484 (quoting Carey, 447 U.S. at 471). According to the Carey 
opinion: 
Preserving the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which men and women 
can repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits, is surely an 
important value. Our decisions reflect no lack of solicitude for the right of an 
individual “to be let alone” in the privacy of the home, “sometimes the last citadel of 
the tired, the weary, and the sick.” The State’s interest in protecting the well-being, 
tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and 
civilized society. 
447 U.S. at 471 (citations omitted) (quoting Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 
(1969) (Black, J., concurring). 
311 487 U.S. 474 (1988). 
312 See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
313 The stated purpose of the ordinance in Frisby was “‘the protection and preservation of 
the home’ through assurance ‘that members of the community enjoy in their homes and 
dwellings a feeling of well-being, tranquility, and privacy.’” 487 U.S. at 477. The Supreme 
Court recently cited Frisby with approval as having “upheld a ban on such [targeted] picketing 
‘before or about’ a particular residence, [Frisby,] 487 U.S., at 477.” Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.Ct. 
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[A] special benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy within 
their own walls, which the State may legislate to protect, is an 
ability to avoid intrusions. Thus, we have repeatedly held that 
individuals are not required to welcome unwanted speech into 
their own homes and that the government may protect this 
freedom. 
. . . There simply is no right to force speech into the home 
of an unwilling listener.314 
Moreover, Frisby made clear that where the intruding speech is 
directed solely at an individual rather than to the general public, even 
“core” First Amendment speech like picketing is less worthy of 
protection, and the government’s ability to restrict it is 
correspondingly greater.315 
Frisby’s recognition that some types of hostile, targeted speech 
may be barred from intruding into the homes of unwilling listeners 
provides a strong basis for allowing § 3617 to ban housing 
harassment without fear of constitutional problems.316 Housing 
harassment is particularly damaging precisely because it affects its 
targets’ sense of security in their home,317 a place where, according to 
Frisby, people have a right to be protected from unwanted 
intrusions.318 Surely, race-based and other invidiously motivated 
neighbor-on-neighbor harassment would be expected to have at least 
as dire consequences for its targets as those that moved the Court in 
Frisby to uphold governmental protection for the targets of residential 
picketing.319 Furthermore, because Frisby and other “unwilling 
                                                                                                                  
 
1207, 1218 (2011). 
314 Frisby, 487 U.S. 484–85 (citations omitted). The Court commented on the nature of 
targeted residential picketing in Frisby. See id. at 486 (noting that this type of speech has a 
“devastating effect . . . on the quiet enjoyment of the home . . . . ‘To those inside . . . the home 
becomes something less than a home when and while the picketing . . . continue[s]. . . . [The] 
tensions and pressures may be psychological, not physical, but they are not, for that reason, less 
inimical to family privacy and truly domestic tranquility.’” (alterations and third, fourth, and 
fifth omissions in original) (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 478 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
315 See id. at 479, 486 (noting that, while the antipicketing ordinance “operates at the core 
of the First Amendment,” the picketers whose speech was restricted “do not seek to disseminate 
a message to the general public, but to intrude upon the targeted resident . . . in an especially 
offensive way”). 
316 For a detailed description of how this “unwilling listener” doctrine applies to FHA 
cases involving sex-based harassing statements challenged under the FHA’s § 3604(c), see 
Schwemm & Oliveri, supra note 280, at 844–53. 
317 See supra notes 280–82 and accompanying text. 
318 See supra note 314 and accompanying text; see also supra note 310. 
319 See supra note 314. 
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listener” cases have upheld restrictions on even core First 
Amendment speech where the speaker “has legitimate and important 
[constitutional] concerns,”320 and have done so by concluding that the 
challenged law “reflects an acceptable balance between the 
constitutionally protected rights of law-abiding speakers and the 
interests of unwilling listeners,”321 they would provide an even 
stronger basis for supporting § 3617’s ban of such low-value speech 
as housing-related harassing statements.322 
F. Summary 
The interpretive sources examined in Part III have established that 
the proper standard for neighbor harassment cases under § 3617 is 
different from the Halprin-Bloch requirement of a “pattern of 
harassment.”323 Indeed, single-incident behavior, as illustrated by the 
cross burnings in Black and R.A.V., would often violate § 3617. Some 
of these single incidents, of course, are egregious enough to satisfy 
the first part of the “severe or pervasive” standard that governs 
harassment cases under § 3604(b) and Title VII.324 The problem with 
using this standard in neighbor harassment cases, however, is that it 
does not reflect the language of § 3617. 
That language makes it unlawful to “interfere with” anyone “in the 
exercise or enjoyment of . . . any right granted or protected by” 
§§ 3603–3606.325 If the phrase “interferes with” is given its common 
meaning—as set forth in dictionaries at the time of § 3617’s 
enactment—then, as the Ninth Circuit held in Walker, this requires no 
more than the act of “meddling in or hampering” an FHA-protected 
right.326 And, according to HUD’s regulation interpreting § 3617, 
rights “granted or protected by” §§ 3603–3606 include the peaceful 
enjoyment of one’s home free from such invidiously motivated 
meddling.327 
                                                                                                                  
320 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 714 (2000); see also Frisby, 487 U.S. at 479, 486 
(described supra note 315). 
321 Hill, 530 U.S. at 714. 
322 To the extent that any First Amendment protection might exist for harassing speech 
otherwise outlawed by § 3617, the exact parameters of this protection should be left for the 
courts to develop over time based on the particular facts of individual situations and the 
doctrines discussed here. As Frisby noted after rejecting a facial challenge to the ordinance there 
based on the First Amendment, “the constitutionality of applying the ordinance to [specific] 
hypotheticals remains open to question.” 487 U.S. at 488. 
323 See supra note 18 and accompanying text (quoting Bloch, which quotes Halprin). 
324 See supra note 215 and accompanying text (citing cases). 
325 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2006).  
326 See supra note 203 and accompanying text (quoting Walker). 
327 See supra text accompanying note 156 (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2) (2010)).  
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Assuming that Burlington’s Title VII standards are adopted in 
§ 3617-based neighbor harassment cases, this would simply require 
that a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position be materially 
affected by the defendant’s behavior.328 This standard might well 
include racist or other invidiously motivated abusive comments by a 
hostile neighbor, even if such comments did not involve a “pattern of 
harassment.” Certainly, such an interpretation of § 3617 would be 
supported by that part of the 1968 FHA’s legislative history showing 
Congress’s desire that this law foster integrated living patterns, as 
well as by the 1988 FHAA’s effort to provide more vigorous 
enforcement in response to Congress’s perception that the original 
statute had failed to achieve its promise. Finally, the First 
Amendment would certainly permit § 3617 to be interpreted to 
prevent neighbor harassment undertaken with an intent to intimidate 
and, based on Frisby and similar home-protection decisions, even 
harassment that lacks this intent but is targeted at minority 
homeowners or tenants and simply reflects an intent to disrupt the 
peaceful enjoyment of their homes.329 Furthermore, such an improper 
intent may be gleaned from a § 3617 defendant’s remarks without 
incurring any First Amendment problems.330  
IV. CONCLUSION 
More than four decades after enactment of the Fair Housing Act, 
thousands of minority families every year are still subjected to 
harassment motivated by race or other FHA-condemned factor. Apart 
from the devastating personal cost to the targets of such harassment, 
this phenomenon frustrates the FHA’s basic goal of breaking down 
residential segregation and encouraging integrated living patterns in 
the United States. Passage of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 
1988, which reenacted the FHA’s key antiharassment provision 
                                                                                                                  
328 See supra notes 226–30 and accompanying text (discussing Burlington). 
329 See supra Part III.E.3 (discussing First Amendment implications of speech directed at 
people in their homes). 
330 See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 721 (2000). The Hill Court noted: 
It is common in the law to examine the content of a communication to determine 
the speaker’s purpose. Whether a particular statement constitutes a threat, blackmail, 
an agreement to fix prices, a copyright violation, a public offering of securities, or an 
offer to sell goods often depends on the precise content of the statement. We have 
never held, or suggested, that it is improper to look at the content of an oral or 
written statement in order to determine whether a rule of law applies to a course of 
conduct. 
Id. 
 1/14/2011 1:31:54 AM 
66 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:3 
 
(§ 3617) and beefed up the FHA’s enforcement procedures, has yet to 
turn this situation around. 
One problem is that the courts have never been clear about the 
basic thrust of § 3617 or its relationship to the FHA’s other 
substantive provisions in §§ 3603–3606, to which § 3617 refers. This 
problem was greatly exacerbated by Judge Posner’s 2004 opinion in 
the Halprin case, which suggested that neither § 3617 nor any other 
FHA provision should be interpreted to outlaw discrimination 
directed at current residents. Before the Seventh Circuit corrected this 
mistake in its 2009 en banc decision in Bloch, the Fifth Circuit and a 
number of district courts around the country decided to follow 
Halprin, leaving the law relating to § 3617’s coverage of neighbor 
harassment badly confused. 
Whether the courts that followed Halprin will now abandon that 
position in favor of Bloch’s new approach remains to be seen. But 
even if they do, one of Bloch’s key directives about neighbor-on-
neighbor harassment cases is troubling, because it chose to adopt 
Halprin’s view that only a “pattern of harassment” could violate 
§ 3617. This view is not supported by § 3617’s text, purpose, or 
legislative history, but it may resonate with those courts that fear a 
broader interpretation of § 3617 would turn the FHA into a “civility 
code” by providing a federal forum for simple “quarrels among 
neighbors.” 
This Article is designed to counteract that fear and to provide a 
solid basis for correctly interpreting § 3617 in neighbor harassment 
cases. By its terms, § 3617 makes it unlawful to “interfere with” 
anyone “in the exercise or enjoyment of . . . any right granted or 
protected by” §§ 3603–3606.331 A proper interpretation of the quoted 
phrases—based on their words’ common meanings as set forth in 
popular dictionaries from the time of the FHA’s enactment and on 
HUD’s current authoritative regulation—would mean that a § 3617 
violation requires no more than that a neighbor’s invidiously 
motivated harassment hamper the target family’s peaceful enjoyment 
of their home.332 The Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title VII’s 
analogous provision suggests that neighbor harassment cases under 
§ 3617 should also require that a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s 
position be materially affected by the defendant’s behavior.333 
                                                                                                                  
331 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2006).  
332 See supra text accompanying notes 326–27. 
333 See supra notes 228–30 and accompanying text (discussing Burlington). 
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This standard should govern § 3617 cases, which means that it 
could well be violated by a single incident, as well as a pattern of 
harassment. Such an interpretation is also supported by the FHA’s 
purpose and legislative history and would not run afoul of First 
Amendment protection for the defendant-neighbor’s speech. 
A few courts have adopted this view of § 3617 in neighbor-on-
neighbor harassment cases. This Article is intended to provide courts 
in future cases with the resources to accept this position and resist the 
unduly narrow perception of § 3617 suggested by Halprin, Bloch, and 
their progeny. Without a proper judicial understanding of § 3617’s 
role in neighbor harassment cases, the problems posed by such cases 
will not be solved and the FHA’s ultimate goal of replacing race-
based residential enclaves with truly integrated living patterns cannot 
be achieved. 
